

Security along the Line of Control in Kashmir  
and the Terrorism Conundrum post-Mumbai 11/26

Professor Richard Bonney<sup>1</sup>

No sane human being can have anything other than sympathy for the Mumbai victims or horror at the apparently nihilistic assassination mentality of the perpetrators of what took place. Nothing that is said here is intended to justify or condone the actions of a group of vicious operatives for whom the word 'terrorist', so devalued today because it has been so overused by politicians the world over, seems too benign an epithet.

The task, however, is to try to make sense of a terrorist action which at first sight seems even more senseless than is the norm. This task is rendered particularly difficult, if not impossible, by accusation

---

<sup>1</sup> The author is Chairman of the Public Policy Research Organization (London). <<http://ppro.org.uk>> Email: [chairman@ppro.org.uk](mailto:chairman@ppro.org.uk). This presentation was made to the South Asia and Middle East Forum special session on 'Pakistan at the Crossroads', held in the Grand Committee Room, House of Commons, London, on 11 December 2008.

and counter-accusation in the media, selective leaks from the police and intelligence enquiries; political 'denunciations' and alleged revelations from all sides; the usual conspiracy theories about the respective roles of the ISI, the CIA and Mossad; even that '11/26', as the Americanized Indians call it, was the work of Western Zionists and Hindu Zionists, specifically 'a joint plan by Israelis, Americans and Indians'.<sup>2</sup> Surprisingly, we are expected to believe in the ineffectiveness of India's Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), an institution which has far more resources – perhaps ten times more<sup>3</sup> – spent on it than Pakistan's ISI (yet it is to the ISI that responsibility for each and every incident that occurs in India, including now the Mumbai attacks,<sup>4</sup> is

---

<sup>2</sup> 'In TV interview, Pakistani Security Expert [Zaid Hamid] accuses Western Zionists, Hindu Zionists of planning 11/26 Mumbai Terror': Memri Special Dispatch 2140 (4 Dec. 2008), Urdu-Pashtu Media Project.

<sup>3</sup> "We don't have the resources to carry out all these operations", says a former ISI chief, Javed Ashraf Qazi. "RAW has a budget 10 times that of the ISI's and it is more effective than the ISI." Quoted by Tim McGirk, 'India vs. Pakistan', *Time* (29 Apr. 2002): <<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,234000,00.html>>

<sup>4</sup> 'With US help, India is said to have collected evidence that points to the role of the Pakistani ISI in the Mumbai Terror attacks... Sources said New Delhi believes

attributed). The fact that one of those arrested in Delhi on 5 December, Mukhtar Ahmed from Indian-controlled Kashmir, is a Special Police Officer, part of a semi-official counterinsurgency network whose members are usually drawn from former militants, comes as little real surprise.<sup>5</sup> After surveying the

---

the Mumbai attack was an operation of the Pakistani Army, its intelligence agency and Lashkar cadres and that the civilian Government there was not kept in the loop... Sources said New Delhi was demanding Islamabad initiate action not only against the Lashkar but also those within the ISI who actively conspired in the Mumbai attacks.' Shishir Gupta, 'New Delhi says ISI, Pak Army helped Lashkar strike', IndiaExpress.com (5 Dec. 2008):

<<http://www.indianexpress.com/news/new-delhi-says-isi-pak-army-helped-lashkar-strike/394450/>> '26/11 terrorists trained by Pak army, navy instructors: Report' ('and directly supported by the ISI', 7 Dec. 2008):

<[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mumbai\\_terrorists\\_trained\\_by\\_Pakistan\\_army\\_navy\\_Report/articleshow/3804856.cms](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mumbai_terrorists_trained_by_Pakistan_army_navy_Report/articleshow/3804856.cms)> General Hameed Gul claims that the ISI 'definitely follows the government's directions and there is no question of it working on its own... The ISI's entire manpower is made up of serving military personnel and they cannot violate any order. It is a highly disciplined organization'. But commentator Daniel Markey states that Gul's remarks about the relationship between the ISI and Islamic militancy should be viewed cautiously. He describes Gul as 'very much a part of the problem'. 'He has been very clear about his political leanings - [Gul] is very clearly aligned with Islamist parties', Markey says. 'What has been interesting is that people like him - other ISI generals - have essentially been able to have a kind of a side policy - or just on the margins of the official ISI - for years now. [That] has allowed them a great deal of flexibility and freedom to continue to do things that, from a U.S. perspective, are deeply counterproductive - with a kind of either passive, and in some cases it looks, active collaboration of their former colleagues [in the ISI].' Ron Synovitz, 'Pakistan tries to clean up ISI image by shutting down political wing', Radio Free Europe / Radio Liberty (26 Nov. 2008):

<[http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistan\\_Clean\\_Up\\_ISI\\_Shut\\_Political\\_Wing/1353314.html](http://www.rferl.org/content/Pakistan_Clean_Up_ISI_Shut_Political_Wing/1353314.html)> Gul rejected the claim in the *Washington Post* that he was on a US-Indian list to be arrested or that he had any current links with the ISI:

<[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Ex-ISI\\_chief\\_terms\\_Post\\_report\\_nonsense/articleshow/3804814.cms](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Ex-ISI_chief_terms_Post_report_nonsense/articleshow/3804814.cms)>

<sup>5</sup> 'Sometimes we use our men engaged in counterinsurgency ops to provide SIM cards to the (militant) outfits so that we track their plans down', a senior officer in Srinagar stated. Rhys Blakely, 'Mumbai terror suspect "was Indian undercover

evidence available up to 4 December, Jeremy R. Hammond, editor of *Foreign Policy Journal*, remarks:<sup>6</sup>

Theories that this was a false flag operation have already begun to spread around the internet, with varying culprits and motives. Whatever the truth is, what is clear from the facts one is able to piece together from media accounts is that there is more to the Mumbai attacks than meets the eye.

There are, after all, about six months to go before the general election in India in May 2009. No wonder there have already been resignations over the apparent intelligence and security lapses, with the likelihood that more will follow. No wonder, the traditional 'blame game' between India and Pakistan has been ratcheted up once more in spite of the joint

---

cop", Times Online (7 Dec. 2008):

<<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5302946.ece>>

<sup>6</sup> Jeremy R. Hammond, 'The Mumbai Attacks: More than Meets the Eye' (4 Dec. 2008): [foreignpolicyjournal.com](http://foreignpolicyjournal.com) and [Countercurrents.org](http://Countercurrents.org)

commitment to an ongoing and ‘irreversible’ peace process. Even Congress president Sonia Gandhi, – by no means the least moderate voice in India – used an election rally at Uri, near the Line of Control in Kashmir, to warn Pakistan: ‘we have striven to have good relations with our neighbours. But this should not be construed as our weakness.’ The convenient ‘foreign hand’ argument<sup>7</sup> precludes any discussion of the failures of governance and disenfranchisement of significant sections of the Indian population.

Let us remember that when the Joint Anti-Terror Mechanism (the JATM) last met in October, its members were already at odds, exchanging accusations with regard to the bombing of the Indian

---

<sup>7</sup> ‘Even if the violence has a Pakistani hand surely there needs to be investigation to track down the detailed planning, the cells, gauging the extent of outside involvement and help and the extent of support within the country. Surely the different forms of violence erupting in the country need to be differentiated in cause and effect? How much of the recent violence is due to the alienation of Indian citizens who have felt disfranchised over the recent years? How much of it is of economic origin? And how much of it is a result of individuals with no other aim than to destabilize the Indian state? How much of it is linked to criminal networks and how much of it has an international dimension? A coherent assessment and response is stymied by the scapegoat “outside” hand.’ Aunohita Mojumdar, ‘Changing the discourse’, *Himal Southasian* (28 Nov. 2008): <[http://www.himalmag.com/26-November-Attacks-on-Bombay\\_dnw98.html](http://www.himalmag.com/26-November-Attacks-on-Bombay_dnw98.html)>

embassy in Kabul on 7 July. India was already demanding at that meeting that Pakistan should hand over some of the individuals who may have been implicated in the Mumbai attacks, and in particular the leadership of Lashkar-e-Taiba.<sup>8</sup> It should be noted in passing that Pakistan accuses India via its intelligence service RAW and the Afghan secret agency of funding terrorist attacks inside Pakistan and attempting to destabilize its young democracy.<sup>9</sup>

We know that in mid-September the CIA station chief in Delhi sought an urgent meeting with his counterpart in RAW to pass on some critical information. From its 'assets' in Pakistan and Afghanistan, American intelligence had come to

---

<sup>8</sup> John Wilson, 'India and Pakistan Address Terrorism Issues as Relations Deteriorate', *Terrorism Focus* (Jamestown Foundation) 5/38 (5 Nov. 2008):

<[http://jamestown.nvmservers.com/366/?tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=34090&cHash=4e72dbe804](http://jamestown.nvmservers.com/366/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=34090&cHash=4e72dbe804)>

<sup>9</sup> Report in *The Nation* (22 Oct. 2008): <<http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-daily-english-online/Politics/22-Oct-2008/Arrested-militants-name-RAW-for-funding-680m-through-Afghan-secret-agency>>

learn that the Lashkar-e-Taiba was planning to launch a major terrorist attack in Mumbai, which would be carried out from the sea. CNN claims that Indian security forces have confirmed to them that not only did US officials warn them of a water-borne attack in Mumbai and of specific likely targets – they were told twice. The area was placed under a higher state of alert for a week, including tightened security measures at hotels, but those efforts were eventually reduced. RAW itself intercepted a satellite phone conversation on 24 September, which specified targets in Mumbai.<sup>10</sup> On 18 or 19 November, RAW intercepted a satellite phone call to a number in Pakistan known to be used by a leader of the terror group Lashkar-e-Taiba, Indian intelligence officials were quoted as saying by ABCnews.com. The Indian

---

<sup>10</sup>

<[http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=b25c25e5-ae43-45a1-a388-150596a0f259Mumbaiunderattack\\_Special&&Headline='US+warned+India+'twice'+about+sea+attack+on+Mumbai'](http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=b25c25e5-ae43-45a1-a388-150596a0f259Mumbaiunderattack_Special&&Headline='US+warned+India+'twice'+about+sea+attack+on+Mumbai'>)>

intercept also revealed a possible sea-borne attack, it was claimed.<sup>11</sup>

If the evidence of the one surviving attacker, a Pakistani from Faridkot in Punjab,<sup>12</sup> Muhammad Ajmal Kasab, is to be believed, Yusuf Muzammil served as control officer for the operation in Lahore, Pakistan, while Zaki-ur-Rehman Lakhvi, the operational commander of Lashkar, worked from Karachi. (Lakhvi was purportedly arrested in Pakistan-administered Kashmir in a crackdown on militants on 8 December.)<sup>13</sup> Both Muzammil and Lakhvi were allegedly in telephone link with the terrorists while the operation was under way. A particularly distasteful detail is the claim of surviving

---

<sup>11</sup>

<[<sup>12</sup> Saeed Shah, 'Revealed: home of Mumbai's gunman in Pakistan village', \*The Observer\* \(7 Dec. 2008\): <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/07/mumbai-terrorism-india-pakistan>>](http://www.hindustantimes.com/StoryPage/FullcoverageStoryPage.aspx?id=b25c25e5-ae43-45a1-a388-150596a0f259Mumbaiunderattack_Special&&Headline='US+warned+India+'twice'+about+sea+attack+on+Mumbai'></a></p></div><div data-bbox=)

<sup>13</sup> Haroon Siddique, 'Pakistan arrests Mumbai mastermind, reports say', *The Guardian* (8 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/dec/08/mumbai-terror-attacks-india>> Tariq Naqash and Syed Irfan Raza, 'Operation against LeT-Dawa launched in AJK', *Dawn* (8 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/08/top3.htm> >

guests that one of the attackers gave the person on the other end of the phone the guests' details and asked whether they should be killed or not.<sup>14</sup> By 6 December, the Indian press was claiming that the US had confirmed to India that 'Pakistan's military and intelligence chiefs' had 'effectively admitted' that the terrorists were Pakistani nationals and members of Lashkar-e-Taiba.<sup>15</sup>

That foreign nationals were the main target, and were particularly singled out for assassination at the hotels received wide attention because of a leak to the media that has since been found to be substantially untrue;<sup>16</sup> the generalized mayhem

---

<sup>14</sup> Jane Perlez and Robert F. Worth, 'Terror Attacks traced to Two from Pakistan', *New York Times* (5 Dec. 2008):

<[http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/world/asia/05mumbai.html?pagewanted=1&\\_r=1&th&emc=th](http://www.nytimes.com/2008/12/05/world/asia/05mumbai.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&th&emc=th)>

<sup>15</sup>

<[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pak\\_admits\\_terrorists\\_were\\_Pakistanis\\_US/articleshow/3800663.cms](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Pak_admits_terrorists_were_Pakistanis_US/articleshow/3800663.cms)> Original report leaked to the *Sunday Times*: Dean Nelson and Barney Henderson, 'Gunmen had elite training "from Pakistan" (7 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5298993.ece>>

<sup>16</sup> The present writer was quoted by the *Belfast Telegraph* on 27 Nov. to the effect that certain foreign nationals had been singled out, based on a leak to the media: <<http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/news/world-news/mumbai-massacre-terrorists-used-al-qaida-blueprint-14083916.html>>

against Indian nationals at the railway station – 55 dead, including 22 Muslims<sup>17</sup> – did not receive any such attention. A clear majority of those killed were Indian nationals.

Much public comment has been directed at the fact that there was prior intelligence about the operation but that the Indian guard at Mumbai managed to slip. What has not received sufficient attention, perhaps, is that there is a plausible explanation for the apparently excellent information possessed by the terrorists about the locations they sought to attack (more detailed than that available via GPS alone). This is that much of the information had been provided by Indians:<sup>18</sup> the statement on 12

---

By 5 Dec. it was clear that this leak to the media was unfounded, and that only 22 foreigners had been killed out of a total death toll of 171, which itself was revised down from an earlier figure of 195 (arising from 'double counting'): AFP, 1 Dec. 2008. Reuters, 29 Nov. 2008, for the 22 foreigners killed. AP, 3 Dec. 2008.

<sup>17</sup> Devraj Dasgupta, 'Of 58 killed at terminus, 22 were Muslims', *Times of India* (3 Dec. 2008):

<[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mumbai/Of\\_58\\_killed\\_at\\_terminus\\_22\\_were\\_Muslims/articleshow/3785932.cms](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/Mumbai/Of_58_killed_at_terminus_22_were_Muslims/articleshow/3785932.cms)>

<sup>18</sup> 'Four Indian Muslims arrested as early as February were involved in the plot by Lashkar-e-Taiba, the Pakistan-based militant group, to attack Mumbai, a senior police officer who handled the case told The Times today. One of them, Faheem

August by India's National Security Adviser, M. K. Narayanan, who told the media that there are '800 terrorist cells' operating in the country, each with 'external support' and 'almost all of the terror cells being headed by Muslims' (*Times of India*, 12 August, cited by Michael Scheuer) suggests as much. So too does the existence of larger quantities of Fake Indian Currency Notes (FICN), by which such terrorist networks may be financed.<sup>19</sup>

For all the propaganda on each side, reputable commentators have talking this year about the 'indigenization' of terrorist violence within India. The Jamestown Foundation's *Terrorism Focus* of 11 September carried an article by the well-known al-

---

Ahmed Ansari, was carrying a fake Pakistani passport and a list and maps of nine targets in southern Mumbai, including the Taj Mahal hotel and other sites attacked last week, the officer said. The revelation undermines India's assertion that the Mumbai attack was planned and executed only by Pakistani members of Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT)...' Jeremy Page, 'Indian terror suspects linked to Mumbai plot', *The Times* (5 Dec. 2008):

<<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5292508.ece>>

<sup>19</sup> Michael Scheuer, 'Playing With Fire: Pakistan's Unintended Strategic Challenge in India's Homeland', *Terrorism Focus*, 5/32 (11 Sept. 2008):

<[http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no\\_cache=1&tx\\_ttnews\[tt\\_news\]=5150&tx\\_ttnews\[backPid\]=7&cHash=675fb88447](http://www.jamestown.org/single/?no_cache=1&tx_ttnews[tt_news]=5150&tx_ttnews[backPid]=7&cHash=675fb88447)>

Qaeda watcher Michael Scheuer on this theme. A brief quotation gives something of its flavour:<sup>20</sup>

more and more terrorist, insurgent, and economic-sabotage operations in the country are being carried out by Indians and not by Pakistanis or Bangladeshis sent across the border by ISI (Rediff.com, July 27).

The difference between the attacks by Islamists in Kashmir and the more recent attacks in India is that, whereas the former involved either foreigners or 'hardcore' locals, the latter involve individuals and cells from a broader section of India's Muslim population (ISN, Zurich, June 13).

It was a pure coincidence that just a day after Scheuer posted his comments on the website of the Jamestown Foundation, which recognized a new

---

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.

capacity for ‘all India threats’,<sup>21</sup> the so-called ‘Indian Mujahideen in the land of Hind’ published its manifesto or diatribe entitled *Eye for an Eye. The Dust will never Settle Down* (12 September 2008/12 Ramadan, 1429 AH). At the time, most commentators were inclined either to dismiss its assertions as spurious or as a statement issued by the Delhi bomb-maker.<sup>22</sup> With hindsight, however, the comments on Mumbai in the manifesto were a more serious threat than might have seemed at the time:

...it seems that the entire **Mumbai ATS has failed to take heed** from our previous warnings and is

---

<sup>21</sup> Ibid. Scheuer comments that the ‘ISI has long worked with several Islamist insurgent/terrorist groups that are active in Kashmir and Bangladesh – especially the Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), Jaysh-e-Muhammad (JeM), and Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami-Bangladesh (HUJI-B) – but these organizations lacked both an all-India presence and the ability to build one. According to Indian security officials, however, Pakistan and the ISI have used Dawood Ibrahim’s Karachi-based D-Company and the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI) to provide the contacts, safe houses, and front organizations needed to allow LeT, JeM, and HUJI-B to become all-India threats. The recent terrorist operations in Bangalore, Ahmedabad, and Surat (July 25–27), for example, are thought by Indian security officials to have been made possible by the support of D-Company and SIMI for the aforementioned terrorist groups (outlookindia.com, August 11–17).’

<sup>22</sup> Quotations in red type are as in the original document posted on the internet. ‘Delhi Terrorists’ Email from Hell: “An Eye for an Eye...” (Sunday, 14 Sept. 2008): <<http://covenantzone.blogspot.com/2008/09/delhi-terrorists-email-from-hell-eye.html>>

deliberately committed to mess with us. You should know that your acts are not at all left unnoticed; rather we are closely keeping an eye on you and just waiting for the **proper time** to execute your bloodshed [*sic*]...

...let the INDIAN MUJAHIDEEN warn all the people of Mumbai that whatever deadly attacks you will face in future, **the only responsible elements** for it will be the Mumbai ATS and their guardians...

The assassination of Maharashtra ATS chief Hemant Karkare, who led the Mumbai response to the attacks, is made more explicable in the light of these threats – his death was not just ‘collateral damage’; it seems that he was being targeted by the militants. However, this still begs the question: which set of militants? For the same Hemant Karkare, it must be remembered, was the principal

investigating officer of *Hindutva* terrorist violence and was under a death threat from groups related to this cause.<sup>23</sup>

Scheuer comments that the main driving force behind the indigenization of terror in India has been the rise of the *Hindutva* extreme right wing and the resulting alienation of the Muslim minority.<sup>24</sup> The diatribe *Eye for an Eye. The Dust will never Settle Down* is quite explicit on the link between *Hindutva* extreme right-wing violence and Muslim counter-violence, starting from the demolition of the Babri Masjid at Ayodhya on 6 December 1992, which was

---

<sup>23</sup> He was leading the investigation into the Malegaon bomb blast, which had an army connection in that RDX (also used at Mumbai) had been allegedly provided to the *Hindutva* terrorists by Lt Col P S Purohit of the Indian army.

<sup>24</sup> Scheuer writes: 'while all intelligence agencies try to hide their hand in covert operations – that is, after all, what makes them covert – Pakistan's ISI should not be given too much, or even a majority of the credit for indigenization. Much of that dubious honour probably should be awarded to the rising power and influence of the Hindu nationalist parties in India politics.' Cf. the detailed arguments of Susai Anthony and Shankar Gopalakrishan, *The Hindutva Threat: Ideology and Popular Base* (London: PPRO, 2008).

the moment when the *Hindutva* threat to the Indian constitution became most apparent in recent times:<sup>25</sup>

The media always uses **double standards** to measure terrorism. The word 'terrorism' is never used when a story on *Sangh* violence is told, no matter how large scale the violence is. The violence unleashed by the *Sangh Parivar* in Gujarat<sup>26</sup> was defined only as [an] 'expression of communalism' and the same is the case with what happens in Orissa at present. At this moment we ask you as to why the '*Sangh* terror' on all the minorities including the Muslims, Dalits and Christians is a rarely noticed idea? It is high time now that all the state governments

---

<sup>25</sup> The authors write: 'never assume that we have forgotten the demolition of Babri Masjid and by Allah we can never forget it! It is that grave mistake of yours which will make you taste humiliation for generations to come. Babri Masjid was and will remain to be our glorious self esteem and Inshallah, we will prove it to you a hornet's nest in which you have immersed your bare hand, unaware of the pain to come.' For the significance of the demolition of the Babri Masjid: Jan-Peter Hartung, Gillian Hawkes and Anuradha Bhattacharjee, *Ayodhya, 1992-2003: the Assertion of Cultural and Religious Hegemony* (Delhi: Media House, 2004).

<sup>26</sup> Richard Bonney (ed.), *Harvest of Hatred. The Concerned Citizens' Tribunal Report on Gujarat, 2002* (Delhi: Media House, 2004).

must know that the trouble faced by us will be definitely repaid and if the Muslims are terrorized, the Hindus can never breathe in peace.

Moreover, and unfortunately for those of us who wish for a peaceful settlement of the Kashmir dispute leading to an amelioration of relations between India and Pakistan, the authors of the manifesto turn their attention also to events in Indian-administered Kashmir:

The injustice and pain inflicted on Kashmiri Muslims during the Amarnath crisis has once again landed you in great trouble, and it seems like our blood you spilled in the police firing is cheaper to you than that of the Hindus of Jammu. With this triumphant attack [the Delhi bombings] which we pay as a **tribute to all our brethren martyrs in Kashmir**, we announce that from now on Inshallah, the Muslims won't cry

alone, our women won't be widowed alone, our children won't be orphaned alone and scores will be settled evenly.

Michael Scheuer is correct in arguing that while the case can be made that extreme Islamist terrorism in India is a largely self-created problem undertaken by fighters who are not automatons blindly doing Islamabad's bidding (see appendix),<sup>27</sup> it will not be acknowledged as such in the foreseeable future, whether the UPA alliance with Congress as its leading member remains in power after the 2009 elections or is replaced by a new coalition led by the BJP.<sup>28</sup> There are no votes to be gained by any such

---

<sup>27</sup> In a subsequent paper published in India, Scheuer argues: '...it would be an error to blame the Mumbai attack and other urban attacks in India exclusively on Pakistan. While the interests of the attackers and those of Pakistan mesh at many points, the Islamist fighters from Lashkar-e-Toiba, Jaish-e-Mohammed, Harkat-ul-Jihad-al Islami-Bangladesh, and the Indian Mujahideen are fighting for what they believe in... They are not automatons who blindly do Islamabad's bidding... they are waging war, in the first and most important instance, in response to the impact of India's policies and the politics of *Hindutva*.' Michael F. Scheuer, 'Don't do an America', *India Today* (4 Dec. 2008): <[http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index.php?option=com\\_content&task=view&issueid=82&id=21794&Itemid=1&sectionid=19](http://indiatoday.digitaltoday.in/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&issueid=82&id=21794&Itemid=1&sectionid=19)>

<sup>28</sup> In the earlier paper, Scheuer observes: "The indigenous Islamists", Indian social scientist Pradip Bose recently wrote, "have thrived on Muslim alienation since the phenomenal rise of the Hindu right in the country in the mid-1980s... so there is no use blaming the 'foreign hand'. We in this country have created this problem"

admission of guilt by complicity, for the Congress party is equally culpable in some states for working in alliance with so-called 'soft *hindutva*' ideology and some of the *Sangh Parivar* organizations. No, Pakistan and the ISI are much more palatable targets, though the definition of what is acceptable 'proof' or evidence may differ between India and Pakistan,<sup>29</sup> as it did between the US and Afghanistan in 2001. That much is predictable. What is unpredictable are the consequences. In the last month of the G. W. Bush administration, the United States is trying to prevent unilateral military strikes by India or other actions

---

(BBC, May 14). There is little doubt, however, that for the foreseeable future, and no matter which party or parties govern India, New Delhi will allot the major share of responsibility for Islamist-conducted domestic terrorism to Pakistan and ISI.' In the 2004 elections, Pant observes, the gains made by the UPA were 'not due to the exertions or popularity of the Congress party but the success of its local allies and [the] unprecedented success of the Communist parties'. Pushpesh Pant, 'India after Elections 2004', *South Asian Journal*, 5 (July–Sept. 2004), 7–14 at 9–10. The fate of the two large parties rests on the achievements or otherwise of their local allies in 2009.

<sup>29</sup> Compare Baqir Sajjad Syed, 'Rice tells Pakistan to act "or US will"', *Dawn* (6 Dec. 2008):

<<http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/06/top14.htm>>

with 'Pakistan awaiting "concrete proof", says Zardari', *ibid.*:

<<http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/06/top4.htm>>

and Jawed Naqvi, 'India "angry", awaiting response, says Singh', *ibid.*:

<<http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/06/top9.htm>>

which will permanently unsettle the peace process. Yet the aim of the Mumbai terrorists and their 'minders' has surely been precisely that.

So there are potentially – though not necessarily, because statesmanship may yet intervene – two main casualties of the Mumbai terrorist attacks. The first is President-elect Obama's policy with regard to Pakistan and Afghanistan: on this argument, the atrocities were designed to provoke a crisis, or even a war, between the nuclear-armed neighbours, diverting Islamabad's attention from extremism in the tribal areas bordering Afghanistan and thus relieving pressure on al-Qaeda, the Taleban and other militants based there.<sup>30</sup> It is still possible for common sense to

---

<sup>30</sup> Jeremy Page, Tom Coghlan and Zahid Hussain, 'Mumbai attacks "were a ploy to wreck Obama plan to isolate al-Qaeda"', *The Times* (1 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5263919.ece>>  
Anwar Iqbal, 'Pakistan not moving troops from Afghan border: US', *Dawn* (6 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.dawn.com/2008/12/06/top5.htm>>  
'India, Pakistan walking into [al] Qaida trap', *Times of India* (6 Dec. 2008): <[http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/India\\_Pakistan\\_walking\\_into\\_Qaida\\_trap/articleshow/3799632.cms](http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/India/India_Pakistan_walking_into_Qaida_trap/articleshow/3799632.cms)>

prevail and for measures to be taken to round up suspects in Pakistan without the recourse to war between India and Pakistan, and this must be the priority task of the outgoing and the incoming American administrations.

The second potential casualty is the prospect of a settlement of the Kashmir dispute between India and Pakistan. As Paul Cruickshank comments, 'it has not escaped the notice of counter-terrorism experts that the two most significant terrorist attacks in India in recent years, both attributed to the LeT, also followed a period of rapprochement between

---

Khalid Hasan, 'Mumbai terrorists sought to provoke Indo-Pak crisis', *Daily Times* (7 Dec. 2008):

<[http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\12\07\story\\_7-12-2008\\_pg7\\_7](http://www.dailytimes.com.pk/default.asp?page=2008\12\07\story_7-12-2008_pg7_7)>, citing Lisa Curtis of the Heritage Foundation. Lisa Curtis, 'U.S. South Asia Regional - not Kashmir - Envoy needed' (5 Dec. 2008):

<<http://www.heritage.org/Research/AsiaandthePacific/wm2158.cfm>> Curtis writes: 'The Indians would be unreceptive to direct international mediation on Kashmir. Any such move in this direction would raise suspicions in New Delhi that Washington is reverting back to policies that view India only through the South Asia lens rather than as the rising world power it has become. This perception could hurt the Obama Administration's ability to build on major gains the Bush team made in improving what Vice President-elect Joe Biden has himself called one of the most important bilateral relationships for the U.S. in the 21st century.' Curtis talks of the danger of 'fuelling unrealistic expectations of those who wish to change the *status quo*': in other words, the U.S., in her view, should side with the Indian against the Pakistan position on Kashmir because of 'the great potential of the U.S.-India relationship'. She does not explain how U.S. relations with Pakistan can be sustained in such circumstances.

Islamabad and Delhi over Kashmir. Having lost thousands of “martyrs” fighting Indian troops, any deal over Kashmir would be an anathema to Kashmiri militants’.<sup>31</sup> Of course, if there is ever to be a settlement of the Kashmir dispute, then all parties will have to compromise and no no-one will be able to claim an absolute victory.

Equally, if such a settlement is to emerge, then there has firstly to be a strategy on how to isolate the extremist groups whose only purpose is to wreck the chances of peace; and secondly, all the issues at dispute – and this means, crucially the issue of water sharing – have to be brought to the negotiating table in a spirit of compromise. Assuredly, if water issues are separated from the Kashmir negotiations – as India has always insisted on up to the present – then

---

<sup>31</sup> Paul Cruickshank, ‘Tackling Kashmir. The Terrorists who attacked Mumbai sought to inflame the region. Obama’s administration must not allow them to succeed’, *The Guardian* (3 Dec. 2008): <<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/cifamerica/2008/dec/03/mumbai-terrorism-kashmir-pakistan-india>>

there can be no resolution of the conflict. For though the Kashmir dispute is about identity issues, including above all recognition of the Kashmir identity, as Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza shows in his recent publication for PPRO, it is also centrally about water resources.<sup>32</sup> In 1990, a Brigadier on secondment from Pakistan remarked in a thesis which he wrote during his time in London that ‘once the Kashmir issue is resolved the water dispute will automatically cease to exist because the headwaters of all the rivers lie in Kashmir’.<sup>33</sup> In the following decade, that army commander – then a General and the President of Pakistan – did more than any

---

<sup>32</sup> Muhammad Nasrullah Mirza, *Hydro-politics: A Latent Dimension of the Kashmir Conflict?* (London: PPRO, 2008). Of particular interest and relevance to peace negotiations – and a must read for the incoming team of advisers for President-elect Obama – is Mirza’s critique of Sundeep Waslekar, *The Final Settlement: Restructuring India-Pakistan Relations* (Mumbai: Strategic Foresight Group, 2005):

<<http://www.strategicforesight.com/finalsettlement/index.htm>>

<sup>33</sup> Brigadier Pervez Musharraf, ‘The Arms Race in the Indo-Pakistan Subcontinent Conflicts with the Pressing Requirements of Socio-Economic Development. What are its Causes and Implications? Is there a Remedy?’, unpublished thesis prepared for the Royal College of Defence Studies, UK, in 1990.

politician in living memory to try to resolve the Kashmir dispute.

The lessons of his failure are four-fold: the intransigence of India, which has little wish to settle the political aspects of the Kashmir dispute and none at all to reconsider the serious disadvantages that the Indus Waters Treaty imposes on its neighbour; the failure to involve the Kashmiri people; the danger of militant activity – on either side – unsettling the peace process if and when it finally makes any progress; and finally the need for brave and enduring political commitment – simultaneously in both India and Pakistan – to the search for a settlement. Such prior conditions for a peaceful outcome have never yet come to pass. Obviously, the Mumbai attacks bring them no nearer.

## APPENDIX

### Michael Scheuer's Six Points for Consideration by India

(Source: Michael F. Scheuer, 'Don't do an America', *India Today* (4 Dec. 2008).

...If Indian leaders are looking to understand the motivation of the Islamists who attacked Mumbai and other cities, they might start with the following:

(1) The Kashmir issue clearly incites Pakistani and Indian Islamists, as well as those associated with or inspired by Al Qaeda. Whether those Islamists are right or wrong is irrelevant. India's position on and actions in Kashmir motivates them. (2) New Delhi's support for the US-led war on terrorism; its nuclear co-operation with the US; and its joint exercises with US troops inside India also inspire hatred among Islamists. (3) India's expanding presence in Afghanistan is anathema to Al Qaeda, the Taliban,

and the insurgent commanders who fought the Soviets in the 1980s. They are determined to prevent the creation of a large, permanent Indian presence in Afghanistan. (4) India's strong, growing, and very public military and security relationship with Israel is perceived as a threat by militant Islamists and ordinary Muslims. (5) For more than a decade, India's domestic politics have taken on – courtesy of Messrs Advani, Thackeray and others – a decidedly Hindu nationalist tone, one that is often anti-Muslim. This kind of politics and its accompanying rhetoric and media-play, together with events like the Gujarat riots, have angered Islamists internationally and appear to be creating a siege mentality among Muslims in India. (6) India's Muslim population has not benefited from the country's economic boom, lagging behind in almost all areas. These shortfalls also contribute to the Muslim community's perception of itself as the target of discrimination.