Hostile Hills and Dry Canals
Pakistan’s Strategic Interests in Kashmir

 

 

Published by

Spearhead Research
http://www.spearheadresearch.org

Name:             Shehzad H. Qazi [sqazi@iupui.edu]

 

Title:               Pakistan's Strategic Interests in Kashmir

 

Institution:     (International Studies Program)

                        Indiana University School of Liberal Arts,

                        Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis

                        Indianapolis, IN 46202

 

 

 

The South Asian region has been marred by regional conflicts for many decades. The largest post-Second World War dispute in the region has been between Pakistan and India over the (previously) Princely State of Jammu and Kashmir. The conflict, almost sixty years old, persists even after the proposal of multiple seemingly viable solutions. The complexity and perpetuation of this dispute clearly indicate that the parties involved have certain underlying strategic interests in this region which they look to safeguard. These strategic interests, which inevitably stand in the way of a settlement, have rarely been stated openly by the governments of either state. This paper lays out the strategic interests that Pakistan finds in Kashmir, focusing primarily on economic and security concerns. It discusses Pakistan’s need of freshwater resources for agricultural purposes and production of hydro-electric energy, and its reliance on the Kashmir region for receiving freshwater. Thereafter, the security risks posed to Pakistan by the loss of Kashmir are analyzed and discussed. Finally, the paper states the changes in attitude and approach which are required and essential in moving towards a peaceful settlement.

 

 

 

Since the partition of British-India in 1947, the new Dominions of Pakistan and India were involved in a heated battle, on the field and inside the diplomatic chambers, over the Princely State of Kashmir. By mid-August 2007, each of the two nations will be celebrating sixty years of independence. After sixty years, three wars [1948; 1965; 1999], and several United Nation Security Council (UNSC) meetings, the resolution of this dispute still does not seem in sight. Apart from the complications that became attached to the problem1, which today warrant remedy and occupy the attention of academics and policy-makers, there exist rather simple strategic concerns of each country in the Kashmir region which act as road blocks in the path to peace and reconciliation in the Indo-Pak region.

 

It is widely argued that either state aspires to acquire Kashmir2 in order to validate the nationalist basis of its creation: it’s “an ideological issue inextricably linked with the two countries’ identities”3. Analysts argue that Pakistan demands plebiscite in Kashmir because it expects Kashmir would choose Pakistan on the basis of common religion, Islam. This is based on the official and popular argument in Pakistan favoring the accession of Kashmir: Kashmir is a Muslim-majority area, Muslims of Kashmir wish to unite with their Muslim brothers in Pakistan, and thus Kashmir must become a part of Pakistan4. On the other hand, scholars argue that India wishes to hold on to Kashmir and federate it to prove that a Muslim majority province can exist and prosper within a Hindu majority nation5, thereby disproving the basis for Pakistan’s creation, [the popular interpretation of] Jinnah’s Two-nation theory6.

This paper was written under the guidance of Dr. Richard E. Ward (Dean of Student Affairs, IUPUI) who mentored the author. It is part of the research carried out in the Summer Diversity Scholar’s Research Program at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis.

Kashmir_disputed areas_2003

  Kashmir Region

 

 

The paramount strategic concerns that each country finds in this region are far more pressing than any theory of nationalism that they may want to preserve or embolden. The dismemberment of Pakistan in 1971—when echoes of Bengali nationalism, not Islamic nationalism were hailed—was enough to disprove the popular interpretation of the Two-nation theory. As for the accession of the entire Kashmir region to either Pakistan or India is concerned, depending on which state Kashmir decides to accede to, or whether it proposes independence, the peoples of either nation would not conclude this as a shortcoming of their nationalism. On the contrary, they will deem the people of Kashmir as ungrateful and treacherous. There already exist in Pakistan stereotypical characterizations of Kashmiris as being ingrates, and it does not take long for people to turn stereotypes into “facts” and harbor hatred on the basis of those self-created facts. 

 

The loss of Kashmir will never be treated by the population of either nation as having some link to a deficiency in their respective nationalisms. Such evaluation requires education and a scholarly analysis, which unfortunately most of the population of these nations does not possess. Therefore, the governments of either nation do not need to focus on confessing to their people that the nationalist calls their predecessors had harped upon were constructed on half-truths or passion-filled fantasies alone. Most academics ignore this reality in their discourse over Kashmir.

 

Pakistan has various geo-strategic interests in the Kashmir region, which include political, economic and security concerns; but, its primary interest revolves around its need for fresh water resources. This paper will primarily focus on what role these concerns play for Pakistan, and why they have become fundamental to any decision that Pakistan would make or accept as part of the Kashmir resolution.

 

A Geographic Analysis

 

Wars and conflicts often have an underlying relation to the consumption or sharing of natural resources. Modern day wars are also linked to interests over natural resources; in each conflict, only a different natural resource takes the role of the constant. It has been widely established by academics that now and in the future, “the natural resource most likely to stimulate interstate resource war is river water”7.

 

With the general importance placed upon oil as a valued natural resource, water seems almost a secondary candidate to fight over. However, the answer to this comes almost naturally from Nirvikar Singh and Ben Crow, who explain: “South Asian governments seek to control…great rivers of their region because they offer partial, but tangible, solution to…fundamental problems of rural poverty, industrial constraints, and urban stress”8. As further discussion will demonstrate, the economic, political and social systems of South Asian states are structured to inevitably make water the single most valued resource, therefore, the resource which entails the greatest conflict.

Pakistan: Drainage of the Indus River and its major tributaries.

Indus

 

The River Indus and its tributaries all come into Pakistan from Kashmir. Originating in Southwestern Tibet, the river flows into Indian administered Jammu and Kashmir. Flowing through Ladakh it crosses through the currently established Line of Control (LOC). It then flows over the Karakoram Range, moving into the Northern Areas of Kashmir (administered by Pakistan) and flows into the North West Frontier Province (N.W.F.P). After approaching the Tarbela reservoir, the Indus finally reaches the Punjab near Kalabagh9.

 

Jhelum

 

The Jhelum River begins in the Indian-held Jammu and Kashmir (J&K) at a spring at Vernag. Falling into the Wullar Lake, the river flows through the Pir Pangal Range. After coming inside Azad Kashmir (held under Pakistan) it goes into the Kishanganga River10, whereafter it flows into the Mangla reservoir and then along the Pakistan and Azad Kashmir border, neighboring the N.W.F.P and the Punjab. From there the Jhelum River makes it way into the Punjab.

 

Chenab

 

Originating in the Indian Himalayan range of the Himachal Pradesh state, the Chenab River flows into Jammu and Kashmir, and from there it flows down into the Punjab11.

 

The remaining two rivers, the Ravi and Sutlej, which along with the three discussed above give Punjab (five rivers) its name, originate and come through India only; therefore, in the current context their geography is unrelated to that of Kashmir’s.

 

The point critical to the discussion is that the essential tern ion of the Indus, Jhelum, and Chenab, which provides most of Pakistan’s freshwater, comes from Kashmir. Its control and usage, therefore, due to the geography, can never be in Pakistan’s direct control unless Pakistan was to gain control of all of Kashmir. Furthermore, it is also seen that the origination of all the five major rivers which form Pakistan’s water resource is external to its borders.

 

Pakistan’s need for water

 

Agricultural needs

 

Pakistan, like other South Asian states, has a primarily agricultural economy12. The Punjab is the agricultural heartland of Pakistan. It is the prime producer of cotton and rice. Cotton is Pakistan’s premiere import. It is also a producer of other staple crops essential to the people and economy of Pakistan for subsistence and commercial purposes. The irrigation and canal systems of Punjab, which are critical to its agricultural sustenance and growth, are completely dependant on the rivers: Indus, Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi and Sutlej, the origination of all of which, as stated above, is external to Pakistan.

 

These rivers also go down and help the irrigation system of the province of Sindh, the economy of which, like Punjab’s, is also focused on agriculture.

Therefore, Punjab’s and Sindh’s ability to produce crops every year, or Pakistan’s survival as an agricultural economy, rests mostly upon its ability to access these freshwaters flowing in from Kashmir.

 

Hydro-power needs

 

Pakistan, though now working towards a civil nuclear program in cooperation with China, till today and for years to come will be primarily dependant on hydropower in order to generate electricity in the country. Pakistan, due to inefficient management of the waters coming in from the Indus, et cetera, is one of the world’s most water short countries13. This adversely affects the country’s energy producing capacity.

 

Regular power outage, referred to as “load-shedding”, is common in all cities where there is electricity. In April and May 2007 the country faced another energy crisis14.

The Mangla and Tarbela dams are Pakistan’s primary hydro-electric sources. The Mangla dam is located in Azad Kashmir and “depends on water coming in from Kishanganga River subsystem in Kashmir”15, which as noted flows from the Northeastern part of Jammu and Kashmir (Indian administered). The Tarbela dam, located in the N.W.F.P, is dependant on water flowing in from the Indus River, which too initially flows in from the Indian administered part of Kashmir. Thus, Pakistan, for hydro-electric generation as well, is completely reliant on water coming in from Kashmir. Till the time it develops alternate sources for power generation, it will need to ensure full access to these water resources. 

 

Security concerns

 

“Kashmir’s vale and the southwest…are…openmouthed toward Pakistan.”16: this observation by Robert Mayfield in his early 1950s study of Kashmir is enough to convey the security threat Pakistan feels from India’s present control of Kashmir17. If India were to gain control over all of Kashmir it would instantly gain the altitude advantage, controlling the mountain ranges from which it could launch attacks on Pakistan. Furthermore, and more importantly, Indian control of Kashmir means Pakistan being surrounded by India on four fronts: South Eastern, Eastern and North Eastern Punjab, and the northern border of the N.W.F.P.

 

Moreover, “should India control Kashmir there would no longer be natural defense lines between the two countries, such as now exist in the Sutlej and Ravi Rivers…Control of the approaches…from southwestern Jammu…make invasion by India easier.” 18

 

In all wars with India so far, as happened in 1965, Pakistan has feared an Indian invasion primarily through Punjab. In the event of India controlling all of Kashmir, thereby Pakistan being exposed on four sides, Pakistani defense officials would fear a situation in which Pakistani forces would be kept occupied with attacks being launched on the North Western, North Eastern and South Eastern fronts, as an invasion through the plains of Punjab is carried out.

 

It was for this reason, the late Premier of Pakistan, Liaquat Ali Khan said in 1951 that “the very position of Kashmir—the strategic position of Kashmir—is such that without it Pakistan cannot defend itself against an unscrupulous government that might come in India.”19 Pakistani insecurities in this regard have been aptly captured by Akbar Khan who said that if Indian troops were stationed all across Kashmir’s western border a permanent threat would loom and “Pakistan’s independence would never be a reality”20.

 

kashmir_region_2003



Hostile Hills and Dry Canals

A plebiscite being held in Kashmir means that all of Kashmir (the entire Princely State as it was prior to the creation of the cease-fire line) must vote. Depending on what choice the Kashmiri people are given, there could result a situation in which either all of Kashmir becomes a part of India or Kashmir emerges as an independent state. Either case would deliver a heavy blow to Pakistani aspirations and interests.

 

Amongst academics and policy makers it has been clear from the start why Pakistan has pushed to gain Kashmir as the fifth province: “Two reasons for Pakistan’s desire to control Kashmir stand out above all: development of hydroelectric power [and] protection of water sources for irrigation in the Punjab and Sind.”21 Even amongst those who emphasize nation-building as being the real reason for Pakistan’s bid to seek to Kashmir, most have recognized this argument.

 

Most of Pakistan’s capacity to produce hydel energy and provide for its irrigation systems is completely dependant on water coming from Kashmir. If India gains further control of the water by governing Kashmir or Kashmir—as an independent state—gains control, water could be diverted from Pakistan. In changed circumstances, the Indus Waters Treaty could potentially be scrapped. And even if it is not, it would definitely be modified to reflect the changed ground realities, as provided by the treaty itself22. Either party to gain control over Kashmir automatically gains the right to make full use of the resources found in or flowing through the land. If India gains control it would look to divert as much water as legally possible to produce hydel energy for its cities and provide for Punjab’s (Indian) irrigation system. Similarly, Kashmiri authorities would use the waters to generate more electricity and provide irrigation for their fields and farms.

 

It has been noted that control of the Jhelum waters by either party—India or Kashmir—through construction of dams, et cetera could put them in a position to “intimidate” Pakistan. Withholding of water would “magnify risk of floods and droughts” and “adversely affect” the Mangla dam, which provides Pakistan’s irrigation and electricity23. With the threat of Pakistan’s water being “shut off” or Pakistan having to counter floods or droughts constantly looming around the edge, Pakistani policy-makers could hardly feel at ease letting potentially adversarial authorities gain complete control over such strategic locations.

 

In addition to Pakistan loosing all chances of control over valuable resources, the loss of Kashmir, for Pakistan, will also result in loss of border with China24. Pakistan would loose direct access to all essential trade routes, and would be dependant upon Kashmir in order to maintain indirect road-route trade links with China. 

 

Border loss with China also means that in times of war China will not be able to provide Pakistan with any support through land. Air would be the only possible way for provisions to come into Pakistan, but that also only by flying over Afghanistan. If Afghanistan does not allow Pakistani and Chinese jets to fly over its territory, Pakistan is practically cut off from China.

 

Another security risk, as briefly discussed above, deals with Indian control of waters flowing into Pakistan. In times of war, India could once again stop supply to Pakistan’s canals, this would “render [the] canal system dry and easy to cross”25 and an Indian invasion could be carried out from Kashmir into northern Punjab.

 

Strategic Interests and Nationalism

 

The people of Pakistan, over the decades have become staunch supporters of Kashmiri freedom. This has come about as a result of government propaganda—as it was in firm control of the media up till relaxations came about during the Musharraf regime—war with India, and the over all tense relations which have prevailed for most part of history. However, the critical question is: what is their definition of “Kashmiri freedom”? Is it “Kashmiri freedom” from “Indian occupation”? Kashmiri freedom to join Pakistan? Or, Kashmiri freedom for self-determination?

 

As a result of popular government rhetoric, such as “people of Jammu and Kashmir […] are part of people of Pakistan”26 and watching footages of Kashmiri’s chanting “Long Live Pakistan”, many Pakistanis firmly believe that Kashmir does not belong with India under any circumstance, India is a forceful occupant, that Kashmir is a part of Pakistan, and that Kashmiri’s want to become a part of Pakistan.

 

This would tie in with the argument of nation building discussed earlier. However, the point to emphasize here is that the people of Pakistan, even though wanting Kashmir to become a part of Pakistan solely on religious grounds, do not think that the basis for the creation of Pakistan can only be complete if Kashmir also becomes a part of Pakistan. The argument to them is that four provinces came together to form a state on the basis of Islam and Kashmir should be added to that federation to further prove the argument that the Muslims of South Asia cannot live under a Hindu-majority rule.

 

 While engrossed in the fantasy of seeing Pakistan as a supporter and insurer of Kashmiri’s fight for freedom, most Pakistani’s have completely looked over the real reasons behind Pakistan’s unflinching opposition to Indian presence in Kashmir and unfettering pursuit of federating the region.

 

The reasons behind Pakistan’s deep interest and concern for the Kashmir region have been discussed above. It would be reasonable, therefore, to conclude that loosing Kashmir will have devastating economic, political and security effects for Pakistan. In a theory based article over water and security, Shlomi Dinar writes, “Lack of economic well-being, political stability, and agricultural sustainability may lead to regional and international instability.”27 This statement in many ways provides in a gist the reason for Pakistan’s strategic interests in Kashmir. Completely dependant on that region for economic well-being, Pakistan would be wary of letting any situation develop which could act as a catalyst in creating intense economic ruin and lead to widespread local instability and total internal collapse.

 

Transcending to the Rational

 

The state of crises which continues in Kashmir is of ultimate loss to all parties involved. Be it the hundreds of young men dying in the streets, Kashmiri women being raped, the youth being “nurtured” by an ugly world of violence and trauma, the high defense costs to Pakistan and India28, tense relations, and an overall perpetuation of instability, the dispute hurts everybody. The first step to peace building is recognition of this ground reality. Such recognition, then, requires a transcension to the rational: a realization of the ills of conflict and the benefits of cooperation.

 

The Definition of Cooperation

 

The definition of cooperation most applicable here is “mutual adjustment of national policies to one another”29. Such cooperation then requires the two states to abandon their historic policies of antagonism. In practical terms, as discussed above, a state of deadlock or standoff in Kashmir benefits no party. Kashmir, enriched with economic resources, strong multi-cultural heritage and scenic beauty, deserve to be emboldened. A changed mindset can propel the parties involved to alter their long held stances; the combatant cold-war mentality of conflict and hostility must be exchanged for the post-cold war attitude of economic progress and acute diplomacy. What could potentially motivate the governments of the region to adopt this new stance is a realization that their respective countries are far behind in economic and social progress—marred by poverty, corruption, illiteracy, and narrow and obdurate feudal mentalities30. It would require an understanding of the crucial link between advancement and survival.

 

Indeed, a lasting settlement of this dispute, a dispute marred by layers of complications, would have to be one which addresses the interests of all parties31, but such a settlement can only come about as a result of cooperation.

 

__________________________________________________________________

 

 

 

Notes and References

 

1.  Some of the major complications surrounding the dispute include: the controversial

accession of the State to India by Maharaja Hari Singh; the 1947 infiltration of Kashmir by Pakistan Army backed irregulars; the Indian occupation (which historically portrayed as a result of the invasion of the irregulars, with new evidence being presented can be proved to be pre-emptive); the infiltration by Pakistan’s Special Services Group (SSG) in 1965; the interference of the Indian government in Kashmir’s politics; the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (ISI) operationalized “jihad” of the 1980s and 1990s.

2.  Here Kashmir refers to the entire area of the Princely State prior to the accession:

Azad Kashmir, Northern Areas (Administered by Pakistan), and Jammu & Kashmir (Administered by India).

3.  Hamir K Sahni. “The Politics of Water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus Waters Treaty”. SAIS Review 26, no.2 (2006): 154; Bajpai, Kanti; Ganguy, Sumit. “India and the Crisis in Kashmir”. Asian Survey 34.5 (1994), p. 402.

4.    Kanti Bajpai; Sumit Ganguly. “India and the Crisis in Kashmir”. Asian Survey 34,

no. 5 (1994): 402.

5.    Ibid.

6.    The popular interpretation of the “Two-nation theory” states that Hindus and

Muslims are two different civilizations, and therefore cannot live together. This interpretation, stating half the reasoning, fails to mention the concept of Islamic-nationalism, Muslim Indian’s political aspirations, their inability to ally with the Indian National Congress’ Hindu-nationalism, et cetera. This interpretation assigns to the theory a seemingly intolerant characteristic which was not part of the original thought, but as result of the communal violence that occurred in India before and during partition, was forced on to it. The theory in its pure form does not instigate or promote communal hatred or intolerant attitudes. 

7.    Shlomi Dinar. “Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation”. SAIS Review 22, no. 2 (2002): 234.

8.    Ben Crow; Nirvikar Singh. “Impediments and Innovation in International

Rivers: The Waters of South Asia”. (1999): 3; available from http://econ.ucsc.edu/~boxjenk/wd_rev.pdf; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.

9.    Refer to map in Appendix;
"Indus River." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
Britannica Online. 8 July 2007 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9110542/Indus-River.

10.  “Jhelum River.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
Britannica Online. 8 July 2007 
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9043618/Jhelum-River
Also refer to map in Appendix.

11.   Refer to map in Appendix;
"Chenab River." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
Britannica Online. 8 July 2007
http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9023805

12.  Nadia Mushtaq; Farzana Noshab. “Water Disputes in South Asia”. Strategic

Studies 21, no.3 (2001): [journal online]; available from http://issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_3/article/4a.htm; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.

13.  Teresita C. Schaffer. “Kashmir: The Economics of Peace Building”. CSIS Report

with the Kashmir Study Group (2005): 17.

14.  “WAPDA in fix as energy crisis worsens”. Dawn. 15 April 2007; available from

http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/16/top5.htm; Internet; accessed 9 July 2007.

15.  International Crises Group. “Kashmir: The view From Islamabad”. (2003): 11;

available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/068_kashmir_islamabad.pdf; Internet. Accessed 20 June 2007.

16.  Robert C. Mayfield, “A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue”. Geographical

Review 45, no. 2 (1955): 187.

  1. It essential to note that historically India has never used this leverage to mount an

attack on Pakistan from this part of Kashmir.

18.  Robert C. Mayfield, “A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue”. Geographical

Review 45, no. 2 (1955):191.

19.  Iffat Malik. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute (Oxford: Oxford UP,

2002), 207.

  1. Rajesh Kadian. The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options (Boulder: Westview

Press, 1993), 112.

21.  Robert C. Mayfield, “A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue”. Geographical

Review 45, no. 2 (1955): 190

22.   Indus Waters Treaty (1960). Article 12, Clause 3; available from

http://www.worldbank.org/; Internet. Accessed 3 July 2007.

23.  Nadia Mushtaq; Farzana Noshab. “Water Disputes in South Asia”. Strategic

Studies 21, no.3 (2001): [journal online]; available from http://issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_3/article/4a.htm; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.

24.  International Crises Group. “Kashmir: The view From Islamabad”. (2003): 11;

available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/068_kashmir_islamabad.pdf; Internet. Accessed 20 June 2007.

25.  Nadia Mushtaq; Farzana Noshab. “Water Disputes in South Asia”. Strategic

Studies 21, no.3 (2001): [journal online]; available from http://issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_3/article/4a.htm; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.

26.  “Jammu and Kashmir is not an integral part of India; it has never been an integral

part of India. Jammu and Kashmir is a disputed territory between India and Pakistan. It is more a part of Pakistan than it can ever be with India…The people of Jammu and Kashmir, sir, are part of people of Pakistan in blood, in flesh, in life, kith and kin of ours, in culture, in geography, in history, in every way and in every form. We shall never abandon it...we shall fight till the end.” Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto in his speech the United Nations Security Council in New York.

27.  Shlomi Dinar. “Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation”. SAIS Review 22, no.

2 (2002): 232-233.

28.  International Crises Group. “Kashmir: The view From Islamabad”. (2003): 3;

available from http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/068_kashmir_islamabad.pdf; Internet. Accessed 20 June 2007.

29.  Shlomi Dinar. “Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation”. SAIS Review 22, no.

2 (2002): 242.

30.  India with its growing economy is still a developing nation and faces (and will

continue to face) the social and economic problems developing nations face. Pakistan, much behind India in economic progress and facing similar problems, has much more to gain from a progressive regional partnership.

 

31.  This essay primarily focuses on the three prominent parties to this dispute, India,

Pakistan, and Kashmir. Whereas it can be strongly argued that China is also a prominent party to the dispute, its involvement has not been as intense as of the above listed. Since the dispute is primarily between Pakistan and India, an agreement between the two is of prime concern.

 

 

 

 

Bibliography

 

Bajpai, Kanti; Sumit Ganguly. “India and the Crisis in Kashmir”. Asian Survey 34, no. 5   (1994): 401-416. 

 

Crow, Ben; Nirvikar Singh. “Impediments and Innovation in International Rivers:             The Waters of South Asia”. (1999): Available from             http://econ.ucsc.edu/~boxjenk/wd_rev.pdf; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.  

 

"Chenab River." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
            Britannica Online. Available from http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-9023805; Internet. Accessed 8 July 2007.

 

Dinar, Shlomi. “Water, Security, Conflict, and Cooperation”. SAIS Review 22, no.2           (2002): 229-253.

 

Indus Basin. Map. Pakistan Water Gateway. Available from            http://www.waterinfo.net.pk/images/fs2i.gif; Internet. Accessed 26 June 2007.

 

"Indus River." Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
            Britannica Online. Available from http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-     9110542/Indus-River; Internet. Accessed 8 July 2007.
 

“Indus Waters Treaty (1960)”. Article 12, Clause 3; available from

http://www.worldbank.org/; Internet. Acccessed 3 July 2007.

 

International Crises Group. “Kashmir: The view From Islamabad”. (2003). Available         from             http://www.crisisgroup.org/library/documents/asia/068_kashmir_islamabad.pdf;     Internet. Accessed 20 June 2007.

“Jhelum River.” Encyclopedia Britannica. 2007. Encyclopedia
            Britannica Online. Available from http://www.britannica.com/eb/article-     9043618/Jhelum-River; Internet. Accessed 8 July 2007.

Kadian, Rajesh. The Kashmir Tangle: Issues and Options. Boulder: Westview Press,         1993.

 

Kashmir Region. Map. Perry-Casteneda Map Collection. U of Texas. 29 March 2007.
            Available from            http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_disputed_2003.j   pg;             http://www.lib.utexas.edu/maps/middle_east_and_asia/kashmir_region_2003.jp     g.; Internet. Accessed 20 June 2007.

Malik, Iffat. Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Mayfield, Robert C. “A Geographic Study of the Kashmir Issue”. Geographical Review   45, no.2 (1955): 181-196.

Mushtaq, Nadia; Noshab, Farzana. “Water Disputes in South Asia”. Strategic Studies        21, no.3 (2001): [journal online]. Available from           http://issi.org.pk/journal/2001_files/no_3/article/4a.htm; Internet. Accessed 26             June 2007.

Sahni, Hamir K. “The Politics of Water in South Asia: The Case of the Indus Waters         Treaty”. SAIS Review 26, no.2 (2006): 153-166.

Schaffer, Teresita C. “Kashmir: The Economics of Peace Building”. CSIS Report with       the Kashmir Study Group (2005): 1-68.
 

 “WAPDA in fix as energy crises worsens” Dawn, 15 April 2007. Available from             http://www.dawn.com/2007/04/16/top5.htm; Internet. Accessed 8 July 2007.