Q2 - 2008
| S. No. | Title | Author | Description | Link | Link |
| 001 | International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2007 |
United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs |
The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "FAA," 22 U.S.C. § 2291). The 2007 INCSR, published in March 2007, covers the year January 1 to December 31, 2006 and is published in two volumes, the second of which covers money laundering and financial crimes. It is the 24th annual report prepared pursuant to the FAA. The INCSR addresses the reporting requirements of section 489 of the FAA (as well as sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as amended. |
 |
|
| 002 | International Narcotics Control Strategy Report 2008 |
United States Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs |
The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with section 489 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the “FAA,” 22 U.S.C. § 2291). The 2008 INCSR, published in March 2008, covers the year January 1 to December 31, 2007 and is published in two volumes, the second of which covers money laundering and financial crimes. In addition to addressing the reporting requirements of section 489 of the FAA (as well as sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as amended), the INCSR provides the factual basis for the designations contained in the President’s report to Congress on the major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing countries initially set forth in section 591 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L.107-115) (the “FOAA”), and now made permanent pursuant to section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L.107-228) (the “FRAA”). | |
|
| 003 | US/PAKISTAN:Policy reforms seek to stem terrorism |
Haider Mullick |
The State Department's annual gloabal terroism report, releaased yesterday, said that al-Qaida had strengthened itself by using Pakistan's tribal areas to rebuild its leadership and recruit new fighters. | |
|
| 004 | Understanding Pakistan's New Counter-terror Strategy | Shehzad H. Qazi | Shortly after their election as the two largest parties in the National Assembly, heads of the Pakistan People’s Party (PPP) and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), announced that changes would be made in the counter-insurgency strategy Pakistan was executing in the Federally Administered Tribal Agencies (FATA) along the Pak-Afghan border. Nawaz Sharif (PML-N) asked for a redefinition of the “War on Terror”. Asif Zardari (PPP) said that Musharraf’s reliance on hard-power and military strategies had produced failure in the last eight years, and it was now time to engage in dialogue and negotiations with the militants. Finally, Premier Raza Gilani said emphasis would now be placed on economic and infrastructural development. | |
|
| 005 | No Sign until the Burst of Fire |
Thomas H. Johnson and M. Chris Mason |
By 1932, British troops had been waging war of varying intensity with a group of intractable tribes along and beyond the northwestern frontier of India for nearly a century. That year, in summarizing a typical skirmish, one British veteran noted laconically,“Probably no sign till the burst of ªre, and then the swift rush with knives, the stripping of the dead, and the unhurried mutilation of the inªdels.”1 It was a savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven by religious zealotry on the tribal side, and it was singularly unforgiving of tactical error, momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance. It still is. The Pakistan- Afghanistan border region has experienced turbulence for centuries. Today a portion of it constitutes a signiªcant threat to U.S. national security interests. The unique underlying factors that create this threat are little understood by most policymakers in Washington. |
|
|
| 006 | Defense And Foreign Affairs Special Analysis As ISAF Command Changes, Time for a Reality Check on |
Defense & Foreign Affairs Special Analysis © 2008 Global Information System, ISSA |
Wishful thinking, a failure to look at history, and a belief in their own propaganda is inducing Washington policymakers and NATO analysts to believe that the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) is making major strides in the US-led campaign to create a Taliban-free society in Afghanistan. Moreover, this artificial view of the situation causes Washington to blame all problems incurred in achieving “victory” in Afghanistan on the US’ own major ally, Pakistan, when Pakistan is, in | |
|
| 007 | Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2009 | Prepared for the Congressional Research Service by K. Alan Kronstadt, Specialist in South Asian Affairs, 6/9/08 | Direct Overt U.S. Aid and Military Reimbursements to Pakistan, FY2002-FY2009 (rounded to the nearest millions of dollars) |
|
|
| 008 | The Iran-Pakistan-India Pipeline Economics, Geopolitics and Security |
Haider Mullick |
The Pakistan Security Research Unit (PSRU) was established in the Department of Peace Studies at the University of Bradford, UK, in March 2007. It serves as an independent portal and neutral platform for interdisciplinary research on all aspects of Pakistani security, dealing with Pakistan's impact on regional and global security, internal security issues within Pakistan, and the interplay of the two. PSRU provides information about, and critical analysis of, Pakistani security with particular emphasis on extremism/terrorism, nuclear weapons issues, and the internal stability and cohesion of the state. PSRU is intended as a resource for anyone interested in the security of Pakistan and provides: | |
|
| 009 | Focusing Pakistan on the issues of: • Democratic Governance • Security and Terrorism • Environmental Issues |
Center for Research and Security Studies House # 60, Main Nazim-ud-Din Road, F-6/1, Islamabad |
Since the ouster of the Taliban government in Afghanistan in 2001, the pro-Taliban militants in FATA and NWFP have remained engaged in intermittent confrontation with the Pakistani security forces. Pakistan army undertook the first major military operation in March 2004 in South Waziristan and there has not been any turning back since then as the confrontation kept escalating at newer – and higher – level with every skirmish happening. While the sporadic military operations kept taking place in one or the other of the seven FATA agencies, militancy kept spilling over into the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Before the implication of the militancy spillover from FATA into settled areas is discussed, it is crucial to understand NWFP and how it differs from FATA. Before we get into a discussion of the causes and implication of the spillover of militancy from FATA to NWFP, we will have to understand what NWFP is, and how it is different from FATA and if the patterns, objectives and operational schemes of the militancy is identical or different at both places. |
|
|
| 010 | Report on Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan | Prepared in coordination with the Secretary of State, the Director of National Intelligence, the Attorney General, the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Administrator of the United States Agency for International Development, and the Secretary of Agriculture | After the attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States and our international partners toppled the Taliban regime in Afghanistan, ending years of brutal misrule and denying al Qaeda a safe haven from which to launch its attacks. The United States is committed to helping Afghanistan recover from decades of strife, and preventing it from ever again becoming a safe haven for terrorists. Our strategic goals remain that Afghanistan is: 1) a reliable, stable ally in the War on Terror; 2) moderate and democratic, with a thriving private sector economy; 3) capable of governing its territory and borders; and 4) respectful of the rights of all its citizens. Achieving these goals requires the application of a whole-of-government approach, along multiple lines of operation, including security, governance, and development. This report describes both the progress we are making in achieving our national objectives, and the challenges we continue to face. | |
|
| 011 | AFGHANISTAN SECURITY Further Congressional Action May Be Needed to Ensure Completion of a Detailed Plan to Develop and Sustain Capable Afghan National Security Forces |
United States Government Accountability Office | Since 2002, the United States, with assistance from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and other coalition nations, has worked to develop the Afghan National Army (ANA) and the Afghan National Police (ANP)—collectively referred to as the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF)—to provide security for Afghanistan. The goal of these efforts is to transfer responsibilities for the security of Afghanistan from the international community to the Afghan government. From 2002 to 2008, the United States provided about $16.5 billion to train and equip the Afghan army and police forces. In 20051 and 2007,2 we found that the training and equipping of the army and police had made some progress, but that the Department of Defense (Defense) and the Department of State (State) | |