

The Interests of Pakistanis Abroad

A classic case of the Pakistan Government’s systemic unwillingness and ignorance

INTRODUCTION

The quest for Pakistan’s identity is not wholly dissociated from the search of a Pakistani’s identity. Of course, the identity of a country will remain an ascription to the figment of a nation-state, whereas the identity of a person – a citizen – will be subjective and unique. Even more so, a person may have ‘multiple identities’; not as a psychological or psychosomatic disorder, per se, but as a web of associations and linkages that a human being has, develops, and remains connected to. When Pakistanis are not encouraged to imbibe a common and vibrant identity under the auspices of nationalism, it becomes clear that those who stay within Pakistan – bearing its conditions of lawlessness, state apathy and uncertainty – will be devoid of identity, if not chipping away at it, while those who emigrate from Pakistan will have the opportunity to generate new identities and create new linkages abroad. The latter condition can be seen in the experience of Pakistani expatriates who have proceeded abroad in the past fifty to sixty years, comfortably inculcating ‘foreign’ mannerisms, cultures and ways of life – the term ‘foreign’ is used instead of ‘alien’ to convey the message that while these identities are not indigenously available to Pakistanis, they conform to them and harmoniously adapt these ‘foreign’ cultural antecedents out of respect for the local people, the local norms, and their ‘new home’. In the same vein, Pakistanis do not consider these cultures as ‘alien’ to them, in which case the emigrating Pakistanis would steadfastly and dearly hold to their own native culture while rebuking and refusing to imbibe the ‘alien’ culture; this is because an ‘alien’ culture can also creep into indigenous territory, i.e. inside Pakistan, and will necessarily draw confrontational viewpoints in terms of ‘us’ and ‘them’. Culture and practical preferences indeed take the shape of ‘us vs. them’ arguments, where great care and deliberation goes into adjudication who or what constitutes ‘the other’; this conceptual problem must be faced in the start of any inquiry about the fundamental differences between Pakistanis in the world today, specifically, the differences in the interests and motivations of Pakistanis who stay in Pakistan and Pakistanis who move abroad.

A HISTORY OF PAKISTANI IMMIGRANTS

Like any other indigenous community, the Pakistani community – those who have been born in this South Asian country after its independence – is also constituted over those who reside in the homeland, i.e. Pakistan, and those who do not, i.e. the expatriate community. Since the birth of Pakistan, there has been a greater ‘outward’ movement of population than an ‘inward’ movement; the Partition and its burgeoning negative impacts made any further ‘inward’ movement into Pakistan redundant if not dangerous. Since the early 1950s and 1960s, Pakistanis with sufficient resources, capital and connections, moved to countries like the USA, the UK and Canada. Pakistan’s history as a colonial holding enabled the English-speaking classes in conveniently proceeding abroad for better remuneration and better lives. A fledgling economy and political uncertainty cultivated the perfect conditions for outbound migration of Pakistanis – the situation continued till 1958, when Ayub Khan proclaimed Martial Law and introduced the first instance of military rule in Pakistan.

Pakistan’s economy definitely saw some high points during Ayub Khan’s reign; industrialist barons would consolidate and become known as the ‘22 families’ who control most (if not all) of Pakistan’s capital and assets. Factories were set up, poverty and joblessness were decreasing, and the example of Pakistan and its ‘managed development’ was extolled to countries like Thailand and South Korea. Even so, such economic ‘high times’ only provided a greater opportunity to skilled workers, experts and professional in terms of proceeding abroad for a better source of income and a better chance at life itself. In effect, more people had the opportunity of proceeding abroad – either on visits or on a permanent emigration – because of Pakistan’s economic betterment in the 1960’s.

During the 1970’s, the nation’s dismemberment, coupled with political turmoil and rapid nationalization, not only eliminated the morale of the Pakistani people, but also significantly debilitated the overall structural strength of the economy. Throughout the 1970’s, and especially after 1977, economic stability and political certainty outside Pakistan attracted most of this country’s citizens to ‘greener pastures’ after their country had ‘failed’ them over an experience of thirty years. This outflow of both skilled and unskilled labour, coupled with an oil-fuelled economic boom witnessed in the Middle East, provided sufficient opportunities abroad for a second generation of Pakistani expatriates. Back at home, Zia-ul-Haq’s repressive political policies and unclear economic policies were surely a discouraging element for those who wished to work in Pakistan, or to start up a business, or to engage with the local economy, in the 1980’s. It is in these years that the ‘black economy’ – to dissociate from a ‘black market’

that operates in the supply of just one commodity – was conceived and propped up. This ‘black economy’ included everything from jihadist ideologies to weapons to drug provision and drug smuggling; an interlinked nexus was established in the Zia times that developed a wholly novel but hidden economic system – the only one that could exhibit signs of ‘economic growth’. However, this system was latent and exclusive; it was neither legal, nor was it beneficial to Pakistan, as today’s experience shows. Pakistan’s guns-and-drugs culture was cultivated and established during this time, and while local opportunities were scavenged over by Afghan refugees, Pakistani citizens proceeded abroad to achieve better sources of livelihood than were available in Zia’s lawless and drug-addled Pakistan. Of course, a better future also awaited them beyond Pakistan’s territorial borders.

In the 1990’s, after Zia’s death, political instability and the turmoil that was expected of a fledgling democracy again made economic woes intolerable for Pakistan – the US dollar increased in exchange value against the Rupee by an average of 19% per annum. Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif could do little to stymie the economic downfall and political uncertainty that was faced by Pakistan. By 1998, Pakistan’s nuclear tests rendered a state of diplomatic isolation where the economy would be gravely affected by the cut-off of aid and trade with the rest of the world. By this time, Pakistanis who were settled abroad were clearly counting their fortunes, while Pakistanis who had spent their lives in Pakistan – witnessing the decay and disintegration of this state over the past 50 years of its existence – could but pray and hope to escape this ‘trap’.

The Musharraf coup and the 9/11 attacks bear striking resemblance to the Zia era and the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. However, the 9/11 attacks had many important impacts on Muslim migration patterns throughout the world; one of the most important of which is the discrimination (or perceived discrimination) that was experienced by not only Pakistanis, but all Muslims, living in Western societies and countries. While this accelerated the flow of remittances to Pakistan, it also yielded a situation where Muslim expatriates – especially Pakistanis living abroad – felt much safer in returning to their native homelands than face ridicule and discrimination as ‘second-class citizens’ in their adopted countries. After the 9/11 attacks, many Pakistanis from the Middle East and North America began transferring their assets and capital back to Pakistan, resulting in the real estate boom – or ‘property bubble’ as it should be appropriately called – and an upsurge in Pakistan’s economic indicators in the earlier part of the 2000-2010 decade. However, the Pakistan military’s modus operandi of peace with militants in the FATA tribal areas, coupled with use of disproportionate (but ultimately

necessary) force in the Lal Masjid Siege, destroyed Pakistan’s fragile sense of internal security, as after 2007, the entire plethora of militant organizations – that had formerly been cultivated and supported by the Pakistani state and establishment for use in India and Afghanistan – had turned against its maker, the Pakistani state, and the ‘infidel’ Pakistan Army. The Center for Strategic and International Security notes that there were 40 suicide bomb attacks in Pakistan in 2007 alone; this rose to an approximate of 1,800 terror attacks in the entire country in 2008. Pakistan’s economic and political machinations of over thirty years had come to naught, and were increasingly being reduced to nothing by the terror-driven militants who now threaten the very essence of security and public order that a modern nation-state is formed to provide.

The War on Terror made Pakistani realize – for the first if not the second or third time – the enormous importance of remittances to the sustainability of its local economy. While the Coalition Support Funds from the War on Terror, and private monies directed back home, registered a positive impact on Pakistan’s economy, such positivity was not supported with complementary infrastructure, local legal support, or capital formation. Moreover, while capital was directed back into Pakistan, it was not done so in a sustainable way, so that in 2008 when the War on Terror opened up a front in the streets of Pakistan’s urban cities, massive capital flight was the first response to these increased hostilities. Now, the importance of remittances is overshadowed by the importance of effective utilization and appropriate channeling of these remittances.

While Pakistanis would feel secure in the US, or the UK, or anywhere other than Pakistan and Afghanistan – where the Taliban and their cronies operate – such a situation has become more difficult because of the antics of one Faisal Shahzad, a Pakistani-born American citizen who attempted to bomb the New York Times Square in May 2010. Faisal’s background and modus operandi has not only made it impossible for Pakistanis to prospectively attain American citizenship in the next few years; it has also put a huge question mark on the loyalties and inclinations of every Pakistani-American (if not every Muslim American) already residing in the US with a US citizenship – so much so that Senators Lieberman and McCain are proposing a law that would revoke the citizenship rights of any American involved in terror activities. Mayor Bloomberg made it clear that no reprisals against Pakistanis or Muslims will be tolerated; this shows that most public commentators and media outlets are expecting some kind of backlash, like the drive-by shooting at a Pakistani-run restaurant in Brooklyn after the 9/11 attacks happened.

This historical perspective on the Pakistani diaspora – a phenomenon with its own Wikipedia page that is rarely updated and refers to dead links of Pakistani government websites – ultimately reveals that today, there are approximately 7 million Pakistanis living abroad who are – apart from being daily ambassadors of Pakistan and of its ‘soft image’ – 4% of the total population of Pakistan and a great source of economic support: funneling remittances worth an average of US\$8 billion per year, sustaining the local economy and Pakistan’s balance of payments.

While abroad, Pakistani immigrants have recreated their own way of life; the emergence of ‘Little Pakistan’ in many areas of the world are testimony to the fact that Pakistanis celebrate their own culture positively wherever they go and wherever they reside – in doing so, they provide an opportunity for foreigners who have never been to Pakistan to interact with Pakistani society and experience Pakistani customs in their own homelands (albeit with different outcomes and consequences). ‘Little Pakistan’ also has a negative connotation (just like the term ‘Paki’) because it also signifies the ‘takeover’ of an American or British enclave by a Pakistani population, thereby incurring racial and ethnic attacks, as well as spiraling performance public services and institutional negligence by the foreign country in which this ‘Little Pakistan’ is born. It is surely news to many of the office-bearers of the OPF and to the CWA’s that they should not only patronize the ‘Little Pakistan’s, but also ensure that these ‘enclaves’ remain positive sources of Pakistani contribution to the local society as well as to the Pakistani society (resident in Pakistan or elsewhere).

According to Wikipedia, ‘Little Pakistan’ is a general name for an ethnic enclave populated primarily by Pakistanis or people of Pakistani ancestry (overseas Pakistani), usually in an urban environment. Some well known ‘Little Pakistan’s include:

- Mississauga, Ontario, Canada
- Gerrard Street East, Toronto, Canada
- Devon Avenue, Chicago, USA
- Jackson Heights, New York, USA
- Holyoke Street, Wichita, Kansas, USA
- Grønland, Oslo, Norway - also referred to as "Little Karachi".
- Alum Rock, Birmingham, United Kingdom
- Green Street, London, United Kingdom

- Aziziya, Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
- Oak Lane, Bradford, United Kingdom
- Great Horton Road, Bradford, United Kingdom
- Jagüey Grande, Matanzas, Cuba

As has been established, millions of Pakistanis immigrated to various countries abroad during the 1970s and 1980s; unlike European immigrants who settled permanently in the new world, Pakistanis who immigrated abroad considered themselves to be *sojourners*, who left to earn money abroad but not to settle, or were students who intended to return to Pakistan when their degree programs were completed.

MOTIVATIONS OF PAKISTANI IMMIGRANTS

After looking at a brief and summarized history of Pakistani immigrants and their patterns of travel/emigration, it is important to reveal what can be indicated as their major incentives or motivations for emigration;

- Better sources of employment, with internationally competitive remuneration that can not only ensure survival, but also sustainable living.
- Better and more effective dispute resolution mechanisms that engender trust, due process and facilitation, not arbitrary actions and imposition.
- Better political systems that afford a voice to all constituents on the basis of a social compact or on the basis of the acceptance of – and conformance to – a ‘general will’ i.e. a Constitution.
- Ensured rule of law, and protection of private and public property, including private enterprise and the right to earn a legal profit, and the right to benefit from the economy.

Of course, these motivations seem to encapsulate – if not highlight – the main reasons for Pakistanis migrating outwards; they not only relate this action to the local situation of Pakistan over the years, but also relate to the general incentives available to anyone who is considering outward migration from a Third World country or a developing country to a developed country.

For want of these conditions in Pakistan, or even the hope of such a situation in the home country, local citizens who were struggling to make ends meet made it their life’s only purpose

and goal to ‘escape’ the downward spiral that Pakistan was continuously mired in. It is deplorable that these citizens – with skills and capacities that have been renowned and acknowledged throughout the world – did not attempt to enhance the situation of their country, or help it achieve some semblance of modern growth and stability; rather, they selfishly chose to maximize their own benefit, and to attain this maximum benefit whether it is in Pakistan or abroad. It must also be noted that these experts and professionals claim to ‘not being provided the breathing space’ or room to operate so as to alleviate Pakistan from its structural and newly-arising woes. The following figure explains the trend of emigration in terms of the typology of labour transfer and the skills of émigrés;

Destination	Skill Level
North America	Professional & Skilled
Europe	Professional, Semiskilled and Skilled
Middle East	Skilled & Unskilled
Asia-Pacific	Professional, Semiskilled & Unskilled

THE DIFFICULTIES FACED BY PAKISTANI IMMIGRANTS

This, however, does not relate to the ease with which Pakistanis were able to proceed abroad, or the facilitation or access that they were afforded once they reached their destination; it is clearly known that Pakistanis were welcome initially as hard workers and labourers who could be hired and paid competitively. As time went by and the global economy became more interlinked and interdependent, the true nature of Pakistani labour and services – especially in comparison to that of Indian-origin and Bangladeshi-origin – became both revealed and despised in the international community; not only in the West, but also in the Middle East. Employers trusted the services as well as the character of Indian labourers; to them, the Pakistani labourer was less efficient and less trustworthy, given his eagerness to readily jump to the next best opportunity, rather than prioritize stability and trustworthiness as characteristic traits of a Pakistani immigrant. These contemporaneous actions also did not help the worldwide image of the “Paki” and the use of this term as a slur against not only Pakistanis, but against all people of Indian/subcontinental origin.

A core difficulty faced by Pakistani émigrés is the lack of support structures afforded to them by the foreign country as well as by the Pakistani state. The Foreign Office of Pakistan, the Overseas Pakistanis Foundation and Community Welfare Attaches have been conspicuously

absent in identifying and addressing the woes of Pakistanis living abroad. From support in local environments to consolidation and functioning of viable ties between Pakistan and the foreign country that houses a Pakistani immigrant, the Pakistani state lags well behind the official functions of India in terms of how it recognizes and supports its Non-Resident Indians (NRIs).

The most important difficulty faced by Pakistani immigrants is that of discrimination – either as representatives of the global Muslim community, or as representatives of a ‘failed state’ in South Asia – and this discrimination takes place not only in the workplace or in official proceedings of executive and judicial matters, but also on the streets of Western cities. In times of such inhumane treatment, it is the duty of the home country – in this case, the Pakistani state – to adequately take charge of the leadership of its non-resident citizens and carefully articulate the requirements and rights of these expatriates so as to present them to the government and state of the foreign country, and associate such measures to bilateral relations between Pakistan and the foreign country.

Another difficulty that Pakistani immigrants specifically face is the conformity to modern values and principles; not only modern and Western social values, but also the understanding and adoption of modern functions. Pakistanis who proceed abroad are basically residents of a strictly conservative and traditionalist environment; when they arrive in a Western country where liberal values and the right of individuals are respected as sacrosanct, they are unable to associate themselves and their traditional structures to these new circumstances. The Pakistani diaspora is continuously perturbed about their younger generations imbibing these ‘foreign’ customs and ‘alien’ cultures; not only have they classified these social systems as ‘alien’ while they are *themselves* resident in these ‘alien’ countries, but there have also been no transitional systems of understanding whereby the interests of Pakistani immigrants are coincided with their children who are born, raised and educated outside Pakistan. The incorporation of modern systems is not only restricted to that of Western society; Pakistan’s Interior Minister exclaimed a few years ago that Pakistanis need to learn how to engage with modern banking methods because even till 2008 they were relying on primitive and unrecorded systems of international monetary transfer, i.e. *hawala* and *hundi*. While such a remark obviously causes concern and raises the eyebrows of both economic analysts and security analysts, it must also be conceded by the honourable Minister that the Pakistani state has not done *anything* to ‘teach’ Pakistani expatriates about modern banking systems, or about how their hard-earned money can be officially and legally transferred back to their relatives in Pakistan *without* detrimentally affecting the Pakistani economy and/or its citizenry.

THE ROLE OF THE PAKISTANI GOVERNMENT

Pakistan has little to no understanding of how to develop connections with its expatriate community, let alone profess the capability of positively channeling the efforts and activities of Pakistani immigrants in their home countries. Neither is there any incentive for a Pakistani to proceed abroad, nor is there any effective channeling of the needs of Pakistanis abroad *or* the needs of Pakistan in terms of its citizens who have emigrated.

The Overseas Pakistanis Foundation (OPF) was established July 1979, with its head office at Islamabad and regional offices in all provincial capitals, as well as in Mirpur, Azad Jammu and Kashmir, which is known to have a large community residing in the UK. Avowedly, the objective of the OPF is to advance the welfare of the Pakistanis working or settled abroad – and their families in Pakistan – by identifying their problems and contributing to their solutions. Clearly, the OPF has not lived up to its basic mandate, as the 4% of the Pakistani population living abroad prefers engaging with private mechanisms of interaction than with this state-run platform. The OPF’s brief includes healthcare, financial aid, foreign exchange remittance and education needs of expatriate Pakistanis; conspicuously absent is the provision of legal facilitation and international services which become all the more important in today’s security-centric and paranoid world. Neither healthcare opportunities nor overseas educational opportunities are publicized by the OPF, while financial aid and foreign exchange remittances are the purview of more central ministries like Finance and Economic Affairs. In utilizing its ‘brief’ mandate, the OPF can aggressively target not only its basic constituents – Pakistanis who do not reside in Pakistan – but can also spearhead interactive activities in education, healthcare and financial opportunities for individuals as well as enterprises and organizations. For this to happen, however, deep-seated corruption and consistent negligence in the Pakistani bureaucracy must give way.

The Pakistan Government’s Community Welfare Attaches (CWA's) are located in 16 cities around the world. Their primary function is to establish and maintain close contacts with foreign firms who require manpower for their ventures in different countries, and to aid in the welfare of overseas Pakistanis. CWA’s are stationed in 16 places in the world; but a closer look reveals that there is only one CWA stationed in Riyadh for the approximately 1.1 million Pakistanis in Saudi Arabia. There are multiple CWA’s stationed in the UAE and the UK, but there are *no* CWA’s in either the US or Canada; home to 0.21 million and 0.12 million Pakistanis,

respectively. It is obvious that the latter mandate of the CWA – to aid in the welfare of overseas Pakistanis – is given little to no credence, and the job of obtaining maximum benefit from foreign firms overshadows all other responsibilities. CWA’s should be monitored in terms of their official functions insofar as they relate to the interests and comfortable life of Pakistanis; promotion of overseas employment, welfare of the emigrants, and safeguarding the interest of emigrants in the host country (including, but not limited to, settling of the disputes and negotiations with their employers). Not only does the CWA offer a greater opportunity for international economic interaction; they also offer a role of the Pakistani state in galvanizing the Pakistani populace that resides in a foreign country; offering them opportunities of identity as well as of association, and being a vibrant organization not of the Pakistani state, but of Pakistanis resident abroad – in terms of how it functions and who it is run by.

Such forums – already existing – can indubitably afford a greater voice to Pakistanis living abroad not only for their local living circumstances, such as better jobs, secure employment, protection from discrimination, etc. but also help overseas Pakistanis recognize their role insofar as their home country Pakistan is concerned, and how they can effectively and positively channel their energies and resources for the betterment of Pakistan while they reside abroad.

The very basis of forming these organizations should be as follows; that overseas Pakistanis do not have to return back home to improve *their own* situation, or that of their country; that by immigrating abroad, a Pakistani occupies a distinct and important role as far as the society and economy of Pakistan is concerned; and that recognition and utilization of all of these roles and functions enacted by Pakistanis in different circumstances is the primary (if not sole) concern of the institutions of the Pakistani state charged with ‘community welfare’ of overseas Pakistanis.

In a recent case taken up by the Supreme Court of Pakistan, it was revealed by the Ministry of Overseas Pakistanis that approximately 6,431 Pakistanis were languishing in the jails of 72 countries. While these numbers show the grave levels of ignorance displayed by the Pakistani state in terms of its emigrants and expatriates, this situation begs the following questions: what legal facilities are they afforded? Does the Pakistani Mission in the given country have access to these jailed Pakistanis? Who is responsible for the due process, or for the expenditures incurred by the foreign legal process for that matter? Does the state of Pakistan remember these citizens of hers, or are they the forgotten sons of Pakistan who are consigned to the annals of human forgetfulness?

POSSIBLE RECALIBRATIONS OF OFFICIAL POLICY AND OFFICIAL FUNCTIONS

It has become obviously necessary – in some ways inescapable – that the resource of the Pakistani workforce must be acknowledged, and effectively utilized to its true potential, so that the Pakistani economy can benefit from the services sector and the tax base that is borne out of this resource. In the same vein, the accolades and facilities that must be offered to Pakistani workers in Pakistan must also be ensured to Pakistani workers abroad, so as to discourage a trend of reverse-immigration that will negatively affect the local labour economy.

It is also necessary to develop contacts with expatriate Pakistanis not only at the grassroots, but also at the level of the leaders of expatriate Pakistani communities, to officially recognize them as expatriate Pakistanis and to afford them facilities and services that they require, or are legally obliged to receive. Every expatriate Pakistani can serve as a ‘brand ambassador’ for Pakistan and its soft image – if the use of marketing terminology will be forgiven in this political economy paper. A Pakistani student who excels in a specific discipline can become a source of pride since s/he is an example of Pakistani excellence from whom both the Pakistani community and international community can learn and benefit; a Pakistani athlete who achieves medals and breaks records can testify to the professionalism and determination of the Pakistani nation as a whole, and should be encouraged to do so not only by the Pakistani people, but also by the state; a Pakistani businessman or entrepreneur who develops innovative business models and creates effective modern synergies can be cited as an example of success to not only global businessmen, but also to Pakistani entrepreneurs working inside Pakistan, and effective socioeconomic linkages can be sought and built thereof. In doing so, the linkages of identity and association are built if not re-energized; while there is so much to be done, it must not be felt that nothing has been done in this case, but that any start will be a good start.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- **Realization of Pakistani’s interests:**

Since there is no realization of the interests of Pakistanis and Pakistan’s civil society, there is obviously no acute differentiation made between a visitor’s interest(s) and an emigrant(s) interests in terms of Pakistan’s official policies. The difference between visitor’s interests (be able to add to respect of Pakistan abroad, build soft image, tourism, shopping, access to culture and opportunities, build partnerships in foreign

country and invite foreigners to Pakistan, etc.) and emigrants’ interests (better job, economic and political security, opportunity for better life, understanding diverse cultures, be a foreigner since living among foreigners in *their* country, add to respect for Pakistan abroad, build soft image, acquire new skills, learn innovative customs, etc.) should be recognized as well as appreciated at the government level in Pakistan. This will not only enable Pakistan to understand the incentives and motivations of its people; it will also prove to be the most efficient profiling mechanism for Pakistan and its allies in terms of the migration of people who are – after the activities of Faisal Shahzad have come to light – readily considered terrorists and jihadists.

- **A positive re-emergence of the Pakistani Identity:**

Pakistanis the world over, and the Pakistani government and state, have consistently fallen short of any and every attempt to dispel negative images about Pakistan; in the same light, Pakistani society has miserably failed in projecting its ‘soft image’ to the world at large. Till date, there has been no collective vociferous rebuttal to the slur ‘Paki’ on behalf of the Pakistani people. A vibrant revival of the Pakistani identity – and of ‘Pakistaniat’ as envisaged by Dr. Allama Mohammad Iqbal – can not only allay the disillusionment of Pakistani immigrants in foreign, alien lands, but also maintain ties and linkages of identity that are extremely crucial in today’s post-modern world. The Pakistani state must spearhead this identity formation exercise, and must closely link it with the activities and interests of the Pakistani civil society, for it to be successfully established and for such models of identity-linkage to succeed. While this takes place in a social environment, there are obvious positive ramifications of this identity-linkage exercise in the economic sphere of life as well. Not only that, but a positive re-emergence of the Pakistani identity will also dispel the negative fallout of international terrorism and its links to Pakistan; the Faisal Shahzad case being a highlight of the same. Faisal Shahzad not only represents the crucial problems being faced by Pakistan internally; his case is also one of Pakistan’s gross negligence and ignorance of the plight of its citizens – whether they reside inside or outside Pakistan – and of the failure to correctly calibrate the foreign policy of the nation to the individual feelings and aspirations of its citizens. This ignorance has led to such a catastrophic outcome that the US Government and the Pakistani Government are still issuing contradictory statements (as of May 10, 2010) regarding the involvement of the TTP in this attempt – in the hope of minimizing fallout and severe consequences.

- **Collaboration between State and Society:**

While it is the most obvious and continuous response of the Pakistani people that state-led solutions are not to be trusted, because they will fail even if they are implemented, it begs the question of private-public partnership in ‘cleaning up’ Pakistan’s image abroad, and developing support systems, facilitation mechanisms and broad solutions for Pakistanis living abroad. In Pakistan, a private solution must be supported by the state and not managed by it (there are clear economic distinctions between the two); globally, Pakistani people (whether residing in Pakistan or abroad) can develop linkages and synergies with the help of (or despite) the foreign country’s state – in the latter situation, it is incumbent upon the Pakistani state to intervene, make Pakistani interests officially known to the foreign country, and develop bilateral functions (if not conditionalities) that ensure the safeguarding of Pakistani interests *as well as* those of the foreign country in which Pakistanis are residing.

- **A Pro-active Foreign Office:**

The Foreign Office of Pakistan is an attached institution of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government of Pakistan. It is the office run by the Foreign Secretary, and all important explanations and elucidations regarding Pakistan’s foreign policy emanate from this institution. It is also the relevant authority administering Pakistan’s Missions Abroad, which are supposed to be the representative of the Pakistani government as well as the Pakistani state in the foreign country. Governments come and go but the relationship between Pakistani state and other states stays because of diplomatic considerations and bilateral relations. Should this not apply to the status of Pakistani citizens living in foreign countries; that no matter who is in power in Pakistan or in the country of residence, a Pakistani’s interests will be secured and their needs and requirements will be addressed and recognized if not met and alleviated? A pro-active Foreign Office, effectively ‘in touch’ with global realities and with Pakistani Missions Abroad, can focus on pro-Pakistan news, information and developments, while performing the role of the first rebuttal if any anti-Pakistan news or development takes place. This proposes a stronger and ‘louder’ role for the Pakistani Embassy in Washington as opposed to, say, PAKPAC (Pakistani American Public Affairs Committee). Such a role will be stronger because of the obvious state support behind it; it will be ‘louder’ because of the cogent sense of identity and association that expatriate

Pakistanis will feel for Pakistan, and for the Pakistani Mission Abroad as a Pakistani institution in the foreign country where a Pakistani has emigrated to.

- **People-to-People Contacts:**

While state-to-state contacts have been elucidated during the course of this paper, and their importance to emigration and expatriate rights also shed light upon, it is ultimately important that people-to-people contacts be cultivated *not only* between Pakistanis and foreigners, but also between resident Pakistanis and expatriate Pakistanis. The primal way of doing so is to increase opportunities for Pakistanis to visit abroad – rather than settle abroad – and to perceive for themselves how Pakistanis are registering a positive impact on the lives of foreigners and on the society of a foreign country. Enhanced people-to-people contact and increased tourism are socioeconomic functions that work both ways; if Pakistanis are awe-inspired by the beauty of the Alps in Europe, it is obvious that foreigners will also be mesmerized by the splendor of the Himalayas and Karakoram peaks littering the Gilgit-Baltistan region in the north of Pakistan; if Pakistanis are surprised by the lush green fields of rural America, foreigners need to look no further than the road routes connecting urban areas of the Punjab that host beautiful meadows on each side of the roads; there is so much that Pakistan and Pakistanis have to offer, and to deny Pakistan its true potential is truly the biggest travesty of our times. An invigorated and pro-active role by the Ministry of Tourism can energize the perception of Pakistan’s beauty especially for those who are not Pakistanis. The ideal result of this method is that foreigners would clamor for Pakistani citizenship, as opposed to Pakistanis fleeing abroad, which is the truth of today’s times.

APPENDIX ONE: Pakistani émigrés

7,000,000+
**Approximately 4% of the Pakistani
population.**

Regions with significant populations¹

 Saudi Arabia	1,100,000
 United Kingdom	1,000,000
 United Arab Emirates	880,000
 United States	210,415
 Canada	124,730
 Kuwait	100,000
 Oman	85,000
 Qatar	52,000
 France	50,000
 Italy	46,085
 Bahrain	45,500
 Greece	45,000
 Spain	42,100
 Netherlands	40,000
 Germany	35,080
 Norway	30,161
 Libya	30,000
 Australia	20,000
 Denmark	19,250
 Ireland	12,500
 Japan	12,000
 Hong Kong	11,000
 Iran	11,500

¹ Retrieved from Wikipedia.

APPENDIX TWO: Foreign Community Welfare Attaches

Pakistan’s Community Welfare Attaches (CWA’s) are currently located² in:

- Abu Dhabi, UAE
- Sharjah, UAE
- Doha, Qatar
- Dubai, UAE
- Jeddah, Saudi Arabia
- Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
- Kuwait City, Kuwait
- London, England
- Manchester, England
- Milan, Italy
- Muscat, Oman
- Oslo, Norway
- Riyadh, Saudi Arabia
- Tripoli, Libya
- Seoul, South Korea
- Manama, Bahrain

² Retrieved from [Wikipedia](#).