

## RELIGIOUS EDUCATION AND VIOLENCE IN PAKISTAN

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For centuries, Islamic schools have preserved and transmitted knowledge, not only knowledge of Islam, but also knowledge of languages, literatures, reasoning, rhetoric, and natural sciences. *Madaris* were established at about the same time – in the 6th century of the Muslim calendar/11th century of the Christian calendar – as the Christian seminaries that grew into modern Western universities. *Madaris* have long been vital to Muslim societies as places to transmit religious learning. Pakistani *madaris* were once known throughout the Muslim world for their well-preserved Hanafi teachings. Today, they are better known, among ordinary Pakistanis, as places where ones' children may get an ethical education, in a disciplined environment, with low-cost accommodations and meals, and improved employment prospects.

Outside Pakistan, *madaris* are known today as breeding grounds for violence. The image, is as misleading as it is simple, but is not without cause. In September 1996, *Taliban* [*madaris* students], mainly Afghan refugees from Jamiat-i-Ulema *madaris* in Pakistan's North West Frontier Province, marched on Kabul, toppled the government of Afghanistan, and imposed their version of *shariah* [Islamic law] on the people living under their control. The *Taliban* used violence to enforce a *shariah* that banned women's formal education, paid work, and appearance in public without a male relative companion, and mandated a schedule of daily prayer and specific (bearded) appearance for men. The rules of public, and private, life that the *Taliban* apparently learned in their *madaris* were strict and unforgiving.

The Pakistani *madaris* has been transformed from a place to preserve Islamic knowledge from Western influence and the colonial politics of the day to a place to mobilize for political influence. Colonial practices fostered suspicions between *ulema* and government as recently as two generations ago. Government mistreatment of religious activists after independence – such as arbitrary arrest and detention and prohibitions on political parties and religious associations – has sustained the mutual suspicions between governments and religious boarding schools, but only since the 1980s

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have *madaris* advocated and been involved in organized violence. The transformation of the *madrassah* is recent.

Questions related to Pakistan's *madaris* have been under public consideration in Pakistan for decades. What role do *madaris* play in Pakistani society? What role should they play? Should the government recognize *madaris* graduation degrees or provide *madaris* or *madrassah* students with financial support? Are some *madaris* involved in organized violence? Will government curricular and registration reform initiatives work? This essay focuses on these questions. At the same time, related social and political questions arise. Why is the national public education system in Pakistan unable to cover most children? Is there any ready alternative to the public educational (and social welfare) that *madaris* provide to more than one million children? Can anti-American sentiment in *madaris* be transformed without a change in the foreign policy of the United States? Accordingly, this essay also addresses such issues as: (1) U.S. and Pakistan government connections to militant organizations, (2) Pakistani government failure to facilitate human development, and (3) Pakistani religious parties' response to an education vacuum.

*Madaris* are vital to the social life of many ordinary Pakistanis. At the same time, some *madaris* foster hatred of secular government, of members of other faiths, and of Muslims of different sects. These teachings quite apart from the activities of specific militant *madaris*, do contribute to sectarian violence. Militant sectarianism did not arise organically within the *madaris*. Sectarianism did find fertile soil in the communities, especially in the refugee communities, that *madaris* served. But militancy was not so much the aims of *madaris* principals, teachers, and students as much as it was their environment.

The frequent war, beginning with a decade long struggle against the Soviet Army beginning in 1979, promoted pervasive militarization, what some call a Kalashnikov culture, throughout Pakistan, especially in the provinces bordering Afghanistan. The *madaris* did not escape this. Many *madaris* took Afghan refugees as students. Additionally, the Pakistani and U.S. government used the *madaris* and influenced their curriculum to intentionally encourage students to engage in sectarian militancy. As a result of these various forces, *jihad* [struggle] is understood by much of a generation of *madaris* students not as a personal struggle against the forces that prevent one from living faithfully but as a violent struggle for the imposition of an Islamic state upon society.

Making matters even more pressing is that more than one and one half million children are studying in *madaris* today because the

national educational system does not reach them or because the education that does reach them is not useful. Former Minister for Religious Affairs Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi estimated recently that as many as 1.7 million students, roughly one tenth of the school-going population, attend *madaris* in some capacity.<sup>2</sup> While many parents of *madaris* students can afford other schools but prefer an Islamic education, many poor families cannot afford to educate their children in a school other than a low-cost *madrassah* or a private religiously affiliated school.<sup>3</sup> The central issue in *madaris* reform should be that millions of students are headed for education in an institution that is not intended to provide general education.

The Pakistani state has failed to meet one of the most basic requirements of any modern state: national general education. Subsequently, the life opportunities of millions are being forfeited. Today, *madaris* are extensively involved in the care and education of the poor because *madaris* are more responsive to social need than the government. There are enormous pressures on existing *madaris* and various incentives to establish new ones. Consequently, many *madaris* do not provide students with adequate general knowledge. Further, the failures of the state threaten to prevent *madaris* from performing their intended function: to provide future *ulema* with the interpretative and reasoning skills to understand the *Quran* and *Ahadith* and *Islamiya* [Islamic studies]. Subsequently, and rather counter-intuitively, the failures of the Pakistani state endanger the social relevance of *ulema*. The Islamic political parties, whose appeal is largely based on criticism of corrupt Westernized governments, are strengthened, on the other hand, by the failures of the state.

Removing violence from Pakistani society will require multiple efforts, including in the educational curricula. The incitement to religious and sectarian violence in the government curriculum would be an appropriate place for curricular reform and peace education.<sup>4</sup> *Madaris* reform may help to reduce but will not eliminate violence in Pakistan.

I begin with a brief description of the origin and evolution of the South Asian *madrassah*. I then place the *madaris* within the larger context of Pakistan's (1) crisis in public education, (2) ideological and political conflicts (seemingly) related to Islam, and (3) promotion of militancy during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan (1979-1988). Together, these considerations – *madaris* education, public

education, and violent sectarianism – help us to assess the viability of the government's present attempts to reform the *madaris*.

#### MADARIS EDUCATION

Islam does not recognize a formal clergy. Instead, the authority of religious leaders depends upon attainment of *ilm* [knowledge]. An *alim* [possessor of *ilm*] is respected for his *ilm* in three areas: (1) theology, (2) Islamic jurisprudence [*fiqh*], and (3) Islamic law [*Shari'ah*]. The *ummah* [community of believers] acknowledge the *alim's* religious education not his birth or office.

The role of *madaris* in Pakistani society has changed rapidly and considerably. *Madaris* in South Asia began as institutions to preserve Islamic learning. Initially, the state – first the Mughal state, then the British state – needed the kinds of graduates whom *madaris* produced – skilled in reading, writing, mathematics, logic, and Persian. With the change of the official language of government from Persian to English, the British colonial government stopped being the chief employer of *madaris* graduates.

For most students in South Asia to study in *madaris* is a religious commitment to preserve Islamic *ilm* against the intrusions of modern secular education. Mullah Nizamuddin Sihalvi (d. 1747) introduced the *madrassah* to South Asia.<sup>5</sup> The *madaris* curriculum is broadly similar throughout South Asia. Twenty subjects are covered using about 80 standard textbooks. Twenty books might be used in any given *madrassah*. Textbooks are written in Arabic. Subjects include logic, mathematics and astrology, philosophy, theology, jurisprudence, Quranic exegesis, rhetoric, and grammar. Mullah Nasiruddin Tusi is said to have founded the first *madrassah* in 1067 in Baghdad. *Madaris* spread quickly, as did Islam itself.

Religious learning in Islam takes place in a variety of institutions. *Jamia* [colleges] and *darul uloom* [universities, literally, abodes of knowledge] provide higher education. *Darul uloom* often approve of the establishment of affiliated *madaris* from which prospective *darul uloom* students might apply for admission. At a local *musholla* [places for daily prayer] and *masjid* [mosques], children learn Arabic, passages of the *Quran*, and *Ahadith*, very often from *madaris* graduates. A *madrassah* is distinguished from other religious schools in that it is residential.

The *madrassah* is sometimes characterized as a place where students endlessly and mindlessly recite the *Quran*. Recitation and memorization is a common pedagogical device. Indeed, to aid in their memorization, many standard *madaris* textbooks are written in rhymed couplets. However, the *Quran* is not typically the principal text in *madaris*. *Madaris* rely heavily on books of *fiqh* [Islamic jurisprudence].

Often these lessons are not discussed or applied to real life situations. Unlike *madaris* before the middle of the 19th century, contemporary *madaris* in Pakistan do not provide sufficient education in *tafsir* [explanation] for graduates to understand and apply the meaning of the *Quran* and *Ahadith* [stories about the life of the Prophet] for the benefit of everyday life. The content of the curriculum and the pedagogy used in *madaris* deserves further study. Much material leaves the impression that *madaris* education is based on doctrinal knowledge rather than knowledge to aid reasoning and on dichotomies (e.g., true and false beliefs).

*Madaris* can differ significantly in the selection of texts, and of the authority of legal scholars on lawful and forbidden behavior. Books of *fiqh* are books of ethics. The Prophet Muhammad received the word of Allah for 23 years and issued clarifications to fellow Muslims on Allah's path [*Shari'ah*]. After the Prophet's death, differences arose about the meaning of the *Quran* and about what was reported and remembered about what the Prophet himself did and said (i.e., *Sunnah*). Books of *fiqh* speculate – using logic, analogies, and precedence – on what would be permissible and forbidden behavior for Muslims. The four major schools of Islamic jurisprudence – Hanafi, Hanbali, Shafi'i, and Malaki – agreeing to disagree – hold somewhat different beliefs about *fiqh*. Before the 10th century, even the renowned authors of today's orthodox book of *fiqh* did not regard their speculations as authoritative or as opposed in any way to others' speculations. A problem in the pedagogy of many *madaris* is that even though the founders of the four schools considered other *fiqh* to be equally authentic and mutually acceptable, *fiqh* is taught as if it were divinely specified.

Parents send their children to *madaris* for a variety of reasons. Many *madaris* are free. *Madaris* provide children with a place to sleep and meals as well as books and instruction. The most obvious reason for sending one's child to a *madrassah* is often overlooked. A *madrassah* provides the opportunity to strengthen one's children's faith. It is important to many parents that their sons are pious Muslims. Parents

also often want to teach their children *adab* [manners]. Parents of *madaris* students express the hope that their children will learn to obey their elders and to be disciplined in life. Children are instructed in how to greet and converse with people of different ages and status and how to address family members and others respectfully.<sup>6</sup> *Madaris* also provide protection from a vagrancy law under which thousands of Pakistani children are in jail.<sup>7</sup> Parents also hope that *madaris* education will keep their children protected from gangs, drugs, and the violence of everyday life.<sup>8</sup> *Madaris* often serve as care-providing institutions for parents who cannot take care of their children. All *madaris* are single-sex institutions and most are for male students. One hundred thousand Pakistani girls and young women are students in female *madaris*.<sup>9</sup>

#### NATIONAL EDUCATION

Pakistan's educational system reflects a deeply divided society. The classes whose educational needs are served by the *ulema* are not the same classes as those who are served by the English-medium government schools. It is possible to identify six forms of education in Pakistan. Elite private English-medium schools serve the upper and upper middle classes. The middle classes send their children to the more affordable elite public English-medium schools or English-medium cadet colleges. Those in lower classes who can afford to pay something for their children's schooling send their children to low cost English-medium or Urdu medium schools. The poor who send their children to school can send their children to very low cost vernacular-medium (e.g., Sindhi or Punjabi) schools or send their boys to free *madaris*.<sup>10</sup>

*Madaris* largely educate children who are neglected by the national educational system. Nearly half of the country's primary school aged population – nearly 20 million children – does not attend school. Nearly one half of the children who do manage to enroll in first grade will not complete fifth grade. Many children of poor families are prevented from obtaining an education by the cost of uniforms, books, supplies, and transportation expenses. Many children are also driven-out of school by low educational standards and difficult conditions at school. Teacher absenteeism is high. Students

report regular beatings at school.<sup>11</sup> Dropout rates are more accurately thought of as push-out rates.<sup>12</sup> Pakistan's push-out rates are among the world's highest. Studies of school continuation rates find that the most significant factor leading to drop out is the absence of teachers and classrooms.<sup>13</sup> Even where there are teachers and classrooms, the quality of education is very poor.

Public school teachers face great disincentives. Working and living conditions are difficult; pay is poor; and status is low. Teachers typically teach a number of subjects and a number of different classes at the same time in the same classroom. There are few facilities. One - fifth of the country's primary schools have no facilities other than a chair, a mat, and a blackboard. Teachers are ranked at the bottom of the government employee scale.<sup>14</sup> This entails less than a living wage and professional embarrassment. According to Omar Noman, "teachers salaries are frequently almost at par with domestic servants... a driver can earn more."<sup>15</sup> Teachers receive no medical or transportation benefits. There are no avenues for promotion. There are no pension plans for most teachers. Teachers are not permitted to form unions. There is a social stigma associated with the profession. Many chose the profession as a last chance at regular employment. Provincial governments have difficulty filling teaching positions with *bona fide* teachers.

The revival of electoral politics and imposition of structural adjustment policies between December 1988 and October 1999 did not have a positive impact on the educational crisis. When the military-appointed government handed over power to a Pakistan Peoples Party government in December 1988, it also handed over its commitment to International Monetary Fund economic austerity measures. Those measures helped to drag into poverty millions of agricultural laborers, subsistence farmers, low wage manufacturing workers, service sector workers, and their dependents. Although the gross national product (GNP) grew at a respectable 4.5 percent per annum between 1991 and 1995 an additional 18 million - half the 1991 levels - people were ground into poverty (defined by minimum caloric intake).<sup>16</sup> At the same time, allocations to education by provincial governments, which

largely fund social sector programs, dropped precipitously between 1988 and 1991, both in constant prices and in per capita terms.<sup>17</sup>

A later infusion of funds did not improve government education. Expenditure on human development increased when the World Bank and the Aid to Pakistan Consortium committed major external funding to Pakistan's Social Action Program in 1992. After 1996, provincial governments began to spend more than half of their budget on social sectors. The increased funds, however, did not improve education. Provincial governments built new schools but failed to staff them.<sup>18</sup> Many fictitious schools, especially primary and middle schools, were imagined. Even nearly non-existent villages may have more than one "ghost school" which appear complete on paper but, on site, consist of an empty, unfinished building. As Governor of Sindh, Moinuddin Haider estimated in December 1998, Sindh province alone had 19,000 "ghost teachers."<sup>19</sup>

The provincial assembly members who were in charge of provincial education ministries are responsible for appointing teachers and principals throughout the country. Typically, a political connection is the chief criterion for appointment. Appointees are not necessarily capable of teaching or intending to teach. Rather, they accepted an appointment with salary as a kind of political reward.

Decades of electoral politics and economic reforms since the late 1980s failed to make government more responsive to public educational needs. The assessment of teachers and principals is not made at the local level, and, thereby, does not involve the communities where teachers and principals work. Parents were not given influence over the provision of public education. Military governments may do some things better than elected governments, but involving local groups in the management of public good is not one of them.

In the 1990s, the proportion of students in private schools increased nationally even while total enrollment and completion rates declined. Studies conducted by the Social Policy and Development Centre found that the public is both willing and able to pay for educational services.<sup>20</sup> Problems within Pakistani education are overwhelmingly in supply not in demand. It is not surprising that *madaris* are most prevalent in rural Northwest Frontier Province, Balochistan, rural Punjab, and rural Sindh where the national (i.e.,

public) school system is most inaccessible or unlikely – given the structure of employment in the area – to guarantee against unemployment. *Ulema* have organized *madaris* to fill an educational and a social vacuum, as well as to indoctrinate children in the ideology of the political parties to which they may be allied.

Access to education and the quality of educational opportunities are far worse in Pakistan than in countries with similar per capita income. The government's investment in education compares unfavorably even to countries with much lower real per capita income. Only four out of the countries for which the United Nations Development Programme keeps data spent less of their total government expenditure on education.<sup>21</sup>

Like *madaris*, private religious educational institutions in Pakistan have educated millions of students. Like the *madaris*, these private religious schools are a part of Pakistan's *de facto* national education system. Individuals and groups have established a large number of private schools through trusts and foundations. According to Professor Ghafor Ahmed, Deputy Chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Nizamati-Islami, the Jamaat-i-Islami's education office oversees approximately 2,000 such private schools. These schools are affiliated with the Jamaat-i-Islami. Members of the Jamaat-i-Islami often privately establish trusts and associations that are not formally associated with the Jamaat-i-Islami or the Nizamati-Islami's 2,000 *madaris*. These independent Jamaat-i-Islami schools solicit and collect funds, build and supply schools, hire and train teachers, and conduct their education on the basis of Jamaat-i-Islami thinking. The Green Crescent Trust operates dozens of such schools in Sindh.<sup>22</sup> The Rural Education and Development Program Trust operates more than 150 such schools in Azad Kashmir.<sup>23</sup> Males and females attend and teach in these schools. Indeed, most teachers are women.

Jamaat-i-Islami members claim that these programs infuse the government curriculum with Islamic studies to favorably influence young people toward Jamaat-i-Islami ideology.<sup>24</sup> Their students take the national government examinations, unlike most *madaris* students, and may go on to higher studies in public and private colleges and universities.

There is an important distinction between *ulema* and educators from Islamist political parties. *Ulema* do not necessarily see it as obligatory to struggle to establish an Islamic state. Many *ulema* are content to operate and educate within a specialized religious sphere that need not suddenly transform the current political system. An Islamist seeks the imposition of Islamic law on society.

#### ORIGINS OF VIOLENT SECTARIANISM

Suspicion between government and religious authorities was the legacy of British rule in India. It did not, however, engender widespread *ulema* violence, even in response to repression of the Indian Mutiny led by Muslim Sepoys in 1857. Violence was, as it is now, the means used by a very small (nevertheless threatening) group of militant utopians, violent "revivalists."

Some of the most obvious causes of sectarianism are the treatment of Muslim institutions under British rule; the creation of Pakistan as a "homeland for Muslims;" the responses of some religious activists to the idea of Pakistan; Pakistani, United States, and Saudi government responses to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan; and militarism within the national social science curriculum. Each of these forces of violent sectarianism deserves a detailed discussion. For our immediate purposes – to establish that these historical and political dynamics, not the *madaris* curriculum, promoted violent sectarianism – a brief survey must suffice.

After the Indian Mutiny of 1857, the *madrasah* became an outpost of learning to protect learned Muslims from Western colonial influences. As Francis Robinson puts it, "Islamic knowledge" was "uncoupled from power" under the British.<sup>25</sup> When the British retook Delhi and other cities in July 1857, they arrested the emperor and other rulers, destroyed Muslim institutions, demolished Muslim buildings, and expelled Muslim populations from their homes and major cities. Mosques were turned into army barracks. Large swathes of Delhi and Lucknow, centers of Indian Muslim culture and learning, were leveled.<sup>26</sup> "Do not go into the ruins of Delhi," warned Khwaja Altaf Husain in 1874. "At every step priceless pearls lie buried beneath the dust."<sup>27</sup> "It was at this time, when Islam had lost its hold on power in India," according to Francis Robinson, "that paradoxically the *ulama* were best placed to lead their fellow Muslims and to spread knowledge of

their faith."<sup>28</sup> The *ulema* spread this knowledge by establishing *darul uloom*, the *madrassab*'s predecessor.

A *darul uloom* in Aligarh and another in Deoband, each established in the United Provinces soon after the Mutiny, reflect two distinct responses by Muslims to the inescapable superiority of British military power in India. The Aligarh school was based on acceptance of British sovereignty and a focus on modern subjects, especially those subjects – principally the natural sciences – that had allowed the British to dominate the modern world.<sup>29</sup> Francis Robinson describes the Aligarh school as "the [Muslim] elite's route to survival under the British."<sup>30</sup> The Darul Uloom, established by a group of "reformist" Muslims in Deoband in 1867, in contrast, attempted to strengthen Islam by purging the *ummah* [Muslim community] of beliefs and practices that it regarded as un-Islamic. Soon, thereafter, a movement lead by Raza Ahmed Khan of Bareli, reaffirmed what the Deoband movement wanted to eliminate. These included visiting the graves of ancestors or revered teachers or offering prayers to ancestors and *pir* [Muslim saints].<sup>31</sup> Differences between the Barelvi and the Deobandi in matters of worship and social practice demonstrated the opportunism of sectarianism. Inherent in the Deobandi *madaris* – the most popular and widespread *madaris* in Pakistan – is a deep suspicion of Westernized rulers, British or local, and of interference from the government.

Demographic changes caused by the creation of Pakistan had a powerful impact on Pakistani society. The creation of Pakistan brought about one of the 20th century's greatest humanitarian disasters. Hundreds of thousands of people were killed, more than 12 million people were displaced, communities and families were torn apart. That division – and the other-worldly legalistic logic behind it – made questions about the appropriate system of government for Pakistan – the hard-won homeland for Muslims – all the more important and all the more difficult to answer. The *ulema* of the Jamaat-i-Islami and Deoband gained ascendance in Pakistan.

The politicization of Islam was inherent in the very notion of Pakistan. The religious violence that precipitated, accompanied, and followed Pakistan's creation raised serious questions about the meaning of Islam in Pakistan. Pakistan was made possible by a political strategy that articulated the need for a homeland for Indian

Muslims (on the basis of religion) but did not articulate any parameters for this new community.<sup>32</sup> That the movement for Pakistan centered on Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a modern, Western-educated Muslim attorney, was enough for the Jamaat-i-Islami and others to oppose the creation of Pakistan. Maududi and leaders of other Islamist parties argued that Muslims left behind in a divided India would be vulnerable. They believed that the leadership of Pakistan would be antithetical to Islam. They also held that the *ummah* [community of believers] already constituted a nation that would only be divided by partition.

Abdul A'ala Maududi founded the Tanjuman al-Quran in 1931 to promote his understanding of Islam, which differed both with that of the Deobandi *ulema* and with that of the modern Muslims in the All India Muslim League. Maududi opposed the creation of Pakistan. In 1941, the year after the adoption of the All India Muslim League's resolution (at the Lahore session) in favor of Pakistan, Maududi founded the Jamaat-i-Islami and became its *Amir* [Chief]. Deobandi *ulema* organized the Jamiat-Ulema-Islam in 1945. While otherwise opposed to the Jamaat-i-Islami, Husain Ahmad Madani, the head of the Deoband Madrassah, also opposed the creation of a separate state for Muslims because it would leave the Muslims in India even more vulnerable.<sup>33</sup>

With the precipitous creation of this most complex of human products, the state, those *ulema* who were opposed to Pakistan's creation turned their attention to struggling for a state that was guided by Islamic teaching. After the creation of Pakistan, Maududi and the Jamaat-i-Islami demanded an Islamic Constitution. Maududi persuaded his followers that Muslims suffered economic servitude and political occupation because they were not living properly as Muslims and that the proscription for Islamic revival was control of the state by a *khilafat* [righteous leader].<sup>34</sup> According to Abdul A'ala Maududi

The root of all the evils you find in the world lies in the bad character of government. ... The real objective of Islam is to remove the lordship of man over man and to establish the kingdom of God on Earth. To stake one's life and everything else to achieve this purpose is called *jihad* [struggle] while

*salah* [prayer], fasting, *hajj* [pilgrimage to Mecca], and *zakat* [charity] are all meant as a preparation for this task.<sup>35</sup>

The Objectives Resolution was the compromise designed to placate the Jamaat-i-Islami and others who demanded that the government adopt *shariah* as the law of the state. The first paragraph of the Objectives Resolution, adopted by the Constituent Assembly in 1949, declares that sovereignty over the entire universe belongs to Allah Almighty alone and the authority which He has delegated to the State of Pakistan through its people for being exercised within the limits prescribed by him is a sacred trust.<sup>36</sup> The Objectives Resolution clearly places the authority of the state with Allah, not the people whom the state serves.

Religious political parties continued their campaign to ensure that the state took a commanding role over politics. The Jamaat-i-Islami launched the campaign in 1953 in Punjab against the Ahmadiya community, which led to thousands of deaths in Jamaat-i-Islami clashes with police. The military acted to contain sectarianism. Martial law was declared in Punjab under martial Law Administrator General Azam Khan to prevent sectarian policies as the response to street violence.

The major religious political parties of today – in a field of 16 at last count – emerged by the 1960s. The three major Sunni political parties are the Jamaat-i-Islami, the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami, and the Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami Pakistani. The Jamiat-i-Ulema Islami is now divided into three groups, that of faction leaders Samiul Haq of the Haqqania Madrassah, Fazlur Rahman, and Ajmal Qadri.<sup>37</sup>

The political party based *madrassah* is a relatively recent phenomenon in South Asia. Militant *madaris* were established with the mission of organizing resistance to the Soviets in Afghanistan after the Soviet invasion in December 1979.<sup>38</sup> These *madaris* grew, as did the refugee community, which sent their boys for education in *madaris*, if they were fortunate enough to find a place, especially as a boarding student, in any school. Generally, it is political party scholars, not the *ulema*, who run these *madaris*.

Not only political parties, but also Pakistan's governments (from the 1970s until 1999) have been major catalysts of sectarianism.

Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, Prime Minister from 1972 until July 1977, did not politicize Islam as much as his successor, General Zia ul Haq, who imposed professedly Islamic injunctions on law and society. Bhutto did, however, set a precedent for capitulating to the demands of Islamists. To distinguish itself from Field Marshall Ayub Khan's government (since 1958), Bhutto's Pakistan People's Party managed to articulate a popularly appealing vision of Islamic social justice. Once in office, Bhutto worked to destroy organizations that could rival him. As a first step to check religious parties, Bhutto nationalized all religious schools – Muslim, Christian, and Parsi – in 1972. In 1973, Bhutto used the language of the Objectives Resolution to placate his detractors in the religious parties. Bhutto's 1973 constitution begins with the same language as the Resolution.

Whereas sovereignty over the entire Universe belongs to Almighty Allah alone, and the authority to be exercised by the people of Pakistan within the limits prescribed by him is a sacred trust.<sup>39</sup>

In 1974, Bhutto consented to the Jamaat-i-Islami's long-standing demand that Ahmadiyas be officially declared non-Muslims. The PPP controlled National Assembly passed an act to that effect. Bhutto managed to sanction the "islamization" of law and public policy and unite the religious opposition. At the very end of his rule, after the contested 1977 elections in which the PPP captured 155 of the 173 contested seats with 80 percent voter turn-out, Bhutto gave concessions to Islamic political parties, including changing the weekly holiday from Sunday to Friday and banning alcohol sale and consumption. The Pakistan National Alliance (PNA), which included the major religious political parties, successfully boycotted the March 1977 provincial assembly polls. Bhutto agreed, in negotiations with the PNA that had originally paralyzed the country with protests demanding his resignation, to constitute a body to hold new elections and manage the transition. However, it was too late to prevent Bhutto's Chief of Army staff, General Zia ul Haq, from removing him from office.

General Zia ul Haq used Islam to "disarm" his adversaries.<sup>40</sup> While Bhutto's successor was known to be a devout Muslim, General Zia ul Haq manipulated Islamic associations in ways that continue to have unwelcome effects on the role of *ulema* in society. The military

government promoted violent sectarianism by promulgating ordinances and taking administrative actions that favored one's school or one sect's interpretation of the *Quran* or *Abadith* or its opinion on social policy. The overwhelming benefactor of Zia's sectarian policies' was the Jamaat-i-Islami.<sup>41</sup>

Zia promoted Shia-Sunni conflict. The Zakat and Ushr Ordinance, promulgated in 1979 and still in effect today, directs banks to make annual withdrawals from personal savings accounts for distribution by government Zakat Boards to select charities and *madaris*, the overwhelming majority of which were Sunni-based. The promulgation of the Ordinance displeased the minority Shia community, which demonstrated against it until an exception was made for Shia who then formed an organization to protect the community from future ordinances of a similar kind. The Zia government is alleged to have split that organization, the Tehrik-i-Jafria, by sponsoring a faction within it and by assassinating the popularly recognized leader.<sup>42</sup> The Tehrik-i-Jafria is one of the two political organizations that was identified as a terrorist organization and banned by General Pervez Musharraf, then Chief Executive, in January 2002.

In 1979, Zia began to promote "Islamization." He established the Federal Shariat Court to test for repugnancy to Islam. Zia also enhanced the authority of the Islamic Ideology Council to recommend policies and laws in accordance with Islam and to advise on whether any policies or laws were repugnant to Islam. Zia also promulgated a series of ordinances, commonly known as the Hudood Ordinances in 1979. These included the Zina [illicit sex] Ordinance, the Prohibition Order [related to alcohol], the Offence Against Property Ordinance [related to theft], the Offence of Qazf Order [false accusation of *zina*]. In 1984, Zia held a national referendum in which support for his continued rule was conflated with support for Islam. In addition to fostering militancy in religious political parties and in imposing his government's authority in civil and criminal law as if it were the authority of Islam itself, Zia introduced "Islamization" in the armed services. Zia promoted distribution among soldiers of passages from the *Quran* on Islam and the conduct of war and appointed qazis to military units.<sup>43</sup>

The U.S. government also conflated military and religious activities. The United States used *madaris* and Islamic teachings to

promote militancy during the war against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. With more than US\$ 51 million in U.S. Agency for International Development funding, between 1984 and 1994 the Center for Afghanistan Studies at the University of Nebraska Omaha developed textbooks that gave religious sanction to armed struggle in defense of Islam. Thirteen million volumes were distributed.<sup>44</sup> Other agencies of the United States government also promoted a militant Islam.

The relationship between the military and the *madaris* continues to be complex, combining elements of deep mutual suspicion and of explicit and implicit cooperation.<sup>45</sup> A large part of the violence and intolerance emanating from religious political parties must be ascribed to the use of religious institutions by government agencies within and from outside Pakistan for military ends.

#### MADARIS REFORM INITIATIVES

Many *ulema* think that *madaris* reform is necessary to sustain the true meaning and social relevance of Islam. Many *ulema* and religious educators would like to see *madaris* curriculum reform. Many *ulema* have argued against militant interpretations of the Quran and Ahadith.<sup>46</sup> They see radical reform of *madaris* to be essential to the propagation and continued relevance of Islam. To advance Islam without sectarianism, some *ulema* and Islamic educators have introduced reforms in their own *madaris* while some have opened new *madaris* or *jamia* or *darul uloom*. Others have established private schools. There is broad support among *ulema* and educators today for a more progressive Islamic education in *madaris* and in other places of religious instruction.

A number of *ulema* and other educators are attempting to initiate *madaris* reform. They note that the *madaris* suffer from serious pedagogical problems. These reformers are particularly critical of the narrow and doctrinaire way in which *fiqh* [jurisprudence] is taught. Mohammad Farooq Khan, for example, notes that the leading *fiqh* sourcebook used in the *madaris*, *Kitab ul Fiqh*, devotes nearly 100 pages of dense text to how to perform *wudu* [ablution], arguing at length over where the face ends and the forehead and neck begin. *Madaris* students may spend two months mastering the passage. Much of what

passes for *fiqh* education in the *madaris*, progressive Muslims argue, is entirely unrelated to Islamic law, distracts students from their relationship to Allah, and makes a mockery of Islamic teachings.<sup>47</sup> They advocate a focus on the *Quran* and its relevance for contemporary law and society. Many *ulema* have drawn the conclusion that *madaris* need to be reformed to ensure the survival of Islam.

The Federal Minister of Religious Affairs in Musharraf's government proposed to create model *madrassah* in each of Pakistan's four provinces and in the federal area of Islamabad. Model Madaris were established in Islamabad, Karachi, and Sukkur. The Federal Minister of Religious Affairs developed materials for them. An accomplished graduate of one of Pakistan's most progressive *madaris* is leading the Model Madrassah in Karachi. The model *madaris* in Islamabad and Sukkur are developing but more slowly.

The model *madaris* experiment is a remarkable success but would require decades to grow to substitute for the tens of thousands of existing *madaris*. By late August 2004 – 26 months after the Ordinance's promulgation – 40 *madaris* had affiliated with the Madaris Education Board. Students in these schools were eligible for bi-annual tuition and personal expense allowances of Rs. 500 (US\$8.62). To collect, parents are required to produce a certificate verifying their status as *mustabiqeen* [deserving poor] and, thereby, their eligibility for *zakat* funds. Islam cautions against seeking *zakat*; and Muslims, generally, would prefer not to have the status of *mustabiqeen*.

The timing of the Ordinance works against its chances of effective implementation. The Indian Parliament was attacked in December 2001. The government of India blamed Pakistan for the attack. In the post-September 11, 2001 environment, India demanded that Pakistan close all militant training camps under threat of pre-emptive strikes. In response, Musharraf declared a ban on two sectarian organizations – the anti-Shia Sipah-i-Sahaba Pakistan and the Shia Tehrik-i-Jafria – and placed controls on the *madaris* to prevent their use for sectarian purposes.

The Deeni Madaris (Regulation and Control) Ordinance was one of the ordinances issued by Musharraf in a compromise with the MMA over the Legal Framework Ordinance (LFO). The Madaris Ordinance gives the choice to all *madaris* to register with the Pakistan Madaris Education Board. *Madaris* registered with the Pakistan Madaris Education Board are given preference in distribution of *zakat* scholarships granted by the Ministry of Religious Affairs. It is

ultimately the *madaris* teachers who will effect (or prevent) reform not government officials. Pedagogical and curricular improvements need to be designed and implemented by *ulema*. The instrumental use of *madaris* by the United States and Pakistan governments in the 1980s caused many *ulema* to regard government reform initiatives with suspicion.

The government already has the authority to close down *madaris* that do not comply with registration requirements. But neither closing *madaris* nor threatening to do so will scare *ulema* into providing financial, curricular, and enrollment information to the government. The Societies Registration Act of 1860 already requires *madaris* to register with and provide financial disclosure to provincial governments; and government aid is already contingent upon such registration and disclosure. The threat of an end to public funding will only confirm, again, the *ulema's* sense that dependence on government funding invites interference. *Ulema* do not want to be audited. Private contributions, given in the Islamic spirit of generosity to the needy, will be seen as the only dependable source of funding.

This is not the first government that attempted to reform *madaris*. Ayub Khan and Zia ul Haq constituted committees with government and *ulema* representatives in 1962 and 1979, respectively.<sup>48</sup> This Ordinance was designed and announced without consultation with the *ulema*. *Ulema* believe that the Ordinance was announced at the behest of the United States. With U.S. armed forces in Afghanistan and Iraq and the perception in Pakistan that the U.S. government is discriminating against Muslims in the U.S. and launching unprovoked military attacks on Muslim countries, interest in the U.S. government and its initiatives (real or perceived) is at an all time low.

The conflict between government officials and *ulema* can be transformed by a more mutually respectful relationship. Many religious leaders – Qazi Hussan Ahmad, the Chief of the Jamaat-i-Islami regard many government officials as corrupt, immoral, and stooges of anti-Islamic foreign powers. However, the government's approach to the *madaris* and *ulema* is not always well informed and is often unnecessarily heavy-handed.

Some *ulema* argue that the latest reforms will fail, not because the *madaris* are not in need of a more socially relevant curriculum, but because the reforms were designed and implemented without consultation with *ulema* and are directed by government officials who

do not have a passable understanding of the *madaris* curriculum and atmosphere.<sup>49</sup>

It is still too early – 25 months since the cabinet approved passage of the Madaris Ordinance – to pronounce the *madaris* reform initiative successful or unsuccessful. The Model Deeni Madrassah in Karachi is thriving. Realistically, however, ground-up (“green-field”) *madaris* reform on a national scale could take generations. Effective *madaris* reform will require meaningful participation by *ulema*. To accomplish this, both the *ulema* and the governmental officials responsible for *madaris* reform must find ways to reduce their mutual animosity. In the past, *ulema* have worked with the government to improve *madaris* education.<sup>50</sup> However, today especially, reform or innovation in the curriculum at the insistence of the federal government is unwelcome to many *ulema*. Discussions and cooperation between education officials and *ulema* that can lay a real foundation for broad improvement in the *madaris* curriculum will need to focus on rebuilding trust rather than resolving outstanding questions about religious education. For example, parents in more conservative areas are more likely to send their daughters to *madaris* schools to study religious subjects than to a government school. Some *ulema* have established educational programs for girls with that advantage in mind without having won the argument in an official committee that women have rights to education.

One proposal for reform is to institute a curriculum change that emphasizes science. The thought is to bring about social change by adding science as a means of insulating students from religious radicalism. However, education in the sciences will not necessarily promote a modern, progressive orientation that will insulate students from radical tendencies. *Madaris* students are not among the ranks of suicide bombers. Many of the most enthusiastic militants are university graduates in the natural sciences. There is no evidence that an education in the sciences ensures students will not become militants.

Efforts to reform *madaris* in Pakistan might learn from similar efforts in other predominantly Muslim countries. The religious association that has overseen *pesantren*, the counterpart of the *madrassah* in Indonesia, has struggled to maintain independence from state power. The choice of *mazhab*, use of *fiqh*, history of the relationship between colonial rule, independence, and religious

associations is widely different. It is significant, however, that in Indonesia the graduates of religious schooling are versed in many topics, literate in Arabic, Javanese (or their native language), Indonesian and experienced in critical debate. In Indonesia, and other countries, *ulema* have an effective and sometimes critical role in promoting democracy, human rights, and social justice from an Islamic foundation.

## CONCLUSIONS

Militancy can be reduced. The roots of militancy in Pakistani society, however, do not lie within institutions for Islamic education. Some of the roots of militancy in Pakistani society are as old as the British colonial responses to political movements, Muslim educational institutions, and other sites of social power not controlled by the state. Some of the roots of militancy are as recent as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the Pakistani, United States, and Saudi Arabia arming and funding of self-professed *mujahideen*.

The importance that the *madaris* system has obtained is largely a reflection of the government's failure to provide education to its citizens. It is not mandatory for parents to send their children to school. Nor could the government implement such a policy should it wish to without massive new investments, new management of schools and teachers, and an overhaul of the present public education system.<sup>51</sup> The greatest threat to personal security and social stability is not the narrow religious curriculum taught in the *madaris*. The greatest threat is the government's near complete neglect of citizen's universal rights, including the right to an education.

The *madaris* are in need of reform, but not because they can equip students with justifications for violence. *Madaris* are in need of reform because they are trying to perform a vital role in society – national education of poor and excluded segments of society – with institutions designed to preserve Islamic knowledge not to provide general or vocational education. Governments have a moral obligation to provide basic education so that people can lead meaningful and useful lives. Because education is the primary means to a full and gainful life, education is a basic human right.<sup>52</sup>

The consequences of a politically motivated instrumental approach to education are evident in the manner in which the major

sponsors of militant teaching are now some of its chief targets. The governments of the United States and Pakistan embraced militant associations and teachings when these could be used to train militants to fight the Soviets and their allies in Afghanistan. Few opposed the policy at the time because their concern was only with using *madaris* to defeat the Soviets in Afghanistan. The United States did not address concerns about the long-term security consequences of arming and funding known militant religious revivalist.<sup>53</sup> It is not clear to militant *ulema* why fighting the other superpower should not be similarly embraced.

*Madaris* and private religious schools are addressing a widespread need. Poor parents have very limited educational options. Successful *madaris* reform ultimately rests on the successful reform of the entire system of public education. Schools will not merely need to be free, they will need to provide additional incentives that may off-set the cost of not having one's children work – such as free meals, primary health care, uniforms, and books. A better public education system could reduce the socially and politically destabilizing class inequalities that are promoted by the vast difference in private (especially English medium) and public school quality in Pakistan.

In the present climate of deep suspicion of U.S. government designs for Pakistan, it would be counter-productive for effective educational reform in Pakistan if the U.S. government is perceived to be involved. Anti-Americanism in Pakistan is high. Sufficient funding and other support for the construction of a national educational system in Pakistan are, nonetheless, required.

(7,551 words)

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## ENDNOTES

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<sup>2</sup> Estimate of madaris enrollment by former Minister for Religious Affairs Mahmood Ahmed Ghazi in an interview in April 2002 with International Crisis Group. International Crisis Group "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," Asia Report No. 36, (Islamabad: International Crisis Group), 2. Proportion of school-going population calculated from Government of Pakistan, *Pakistan Economic Survey 1994-95*, Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1995, 212, which puts primary, secondary, and vocational combined male and female enrollment at just over 18 million.

<sup>3</sup> This essay largely leaves aside the religiously affiliated private foundations, trust, and charities and their schools, which number in the thousands and have a nation-wide reach. These schools prepare student to pass national matriculation examinations but also infuse their curriculum with an Islamic education, often with beliefs unique to a political party or sect of Islam. This is an important and understudied phenomenon.

<sup>4</sup> On education for religious intolerance, see the analysis of government social science curriculum by Khurshid Hasanain and A. H. Nayyar, "Conflict and Violence in the Educational Process in Pakistan," in Zia Mian and Iftikar Ahmad, eds., *Making Enemies, Creating Conflict: Pakistan's Crises of State and Society*, (Lahore: Mashal: 1997), 129-146.

<sup>5</sup> Francis Robinson, "Knowledge, Its Transmission, and the Making of Muslim Societies."

<sup>6</sup> Shaikh Allah Rabani, Jamia Banuria Masjid, Karachi, interview, January 3, 2000.

<sup>7</sup> Myron Weiner and Omar Noman, *The Child and the State in India and Pakistan*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993).

<sup>8</sup> Ibid.

<sup>9</sup> Qibla Ayaz, Dean and Professor of Seerat Studies, Centre for Islamic and Oriental Studies, University of Peshawar, Peshawar interview, August 13, 2004.

<sup>10</sup> Tariq Rahman, "Worlds Apart: An Opinion Survey," *News*, May 12, 2000, 4.

<sup>11</sup> Donald Warwick and Fernando Reimers, *Hope or Despair? Learning in Pakistan's Primary Schools*, (Westport: London, 1995), 19-22.

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<sup>12</sup> Myron Weiner and Omar Noman, *The Child and the State in India and Pakistan*. (page numbers?)

<sup>13</sup> Social Policy and Development Centre, *Review of the Social Action Program*, (Karachi: SPDC, June 1997), vii.

<sup>14</sup> Warwick and Reimers, *Hope or Despair?*, 29-41.

<sup>15</sup> Omar Noman, "Primary Education in Pakistan," in Weiner and Noman, *The Child and the State in India and Pakistan*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 1995), 258.

<sup>16</sup> Mahbub ul Haq reported an increase in the poverty rate over the period from 20% to 30% of the total population. Mahbub ul Haq and Khadija Haq, *Human Development in South Asia 1998*, (Oxford: Human Development Centre, 1998), 17.

<sup>17</sup> World Bank, Country Operations Division, South Asia Region, *Pakistan: Poverty Assessment*, (Washington, DC: World Bank, 25 September 1995), 68-69.

<sup>18</sup> Aisha Ghaus-Pasha, et al, *Social Development in Pakistan*, 40.

<sup>19</sup> "Sindh has 19,000 ghost teachers," *Dawn*, (December 1, 1998), 3.

<sup>20</sup> Social Policy and Development Centre, "User Charges in Education," policy paper 3, (1994).

<sup>21</sup> United Nations Development Programme, *Human Development Report 2002*, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 172-175. In 1999-2001, the latest year for which figures are available, only Equatorial Guinea (1.6), Greece (7.0), Guinea-Bissau (4.8), and Panama (7.5) spent a smaller percentage of total government expenditure on education than Pakistan (7.8).

<sup>22</sup> Siraj Khilji, Central Working Committee, Center for Educational Research and Development, and Shehzad Chishti, Chief, Nizamati Islami, Jamaat-i-Islami, Sindh Province, Karachi, interview, June 26, 1999.

<sup>23</sup> See David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

<sup>24</sup> Abrara Ahmed, Director, Shafi Reso-Chem and Treasurer and Member Central Working Committee, Green Crescent Trust, and Zahid Saeed, Managing Director, Indus Pharma and Chairman, Central Working Committee, Green Crescent Trust, Karachi, interview, June 29, 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Francis Robinson, "Knowledge, Its Transmission, and the Making of Muslim Societies," in Francis Robinson, ed., *Cambridge Illustrated History of the Islamic World*, (London: Cambridge University Press, 1996) 242.

<sup>26</sup> On the impact on Muslims of the suppression of Indian Mutiny, see Francis Robinson, "The Muslims of Upper India and the Shock of the Mutiny," in Francis

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Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 138-155.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid, 149.

<sup>28</sup> Ibid.

<sup>29</sup> See David Lelyveld, *Aligarh's First Generation: Muslim Solidarity in British India*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1978).

<sup>30</sup> Francis Robinson, "Nineteenth-Century Indian Islam," in Francis Robinson, *Islam and Muslim History in South Asia*, 240.

<sup>31</sup> See Barbara Metcalf, *Islamic Revival in British India: Deoband 1860-1900*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1982).

<sup>32</sup> Ayseha Jalal, *The Sole Spokesman: Jinnah, the Muslim League and the Demand for Pakistan*, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985).

<sup>33</sup> Faruqi, *Pakistan: A Crisis in the Renaissance of Islam*, 179.

<sup>34</sup> See Zafaryab Ahmed, "Maudoodi's Islamic State," in Asghar Khan, ed., *Islam, Politics and the State, The Pakistan Experience*, (London: Zed books, 1985).

<sup>35</sup> Syed Abul A'la Maududi, *Fundamentals of Islam*, (Lahore: Islamic Publications, 1975), 243.

<sup>36</sup> Government of Pakistan, Federal Judicial Academy, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, (Islamabad: Government of Pakistan, 1989), 211.

<sup>37</sup> International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military," 6.

<sup>38</sup> See Mumtaz Ahmad, "Continuity and Change in the Traditional System of Islamic Education: The Case of Pakistan," in Charles Kennedy and Craig Baxter, eds., *Pakistan 2000*, (Karachi: Oxford University Press, 2000), 182-194 and Husain Haqqani, "Islam's Medieval Outposts," *Foreign Policy*, (November-December 2002), 68-64.

<sup>39</sup> Government of Pakistan, *The Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan*, 1.

<sup>40</sup> Abbas Rashidi, "Pakistan: The Ideological Dimension," in Asghar Khan, ed., *Islam, Politics and the State, The Pakistan Experience*, (London: Zed books, 1985).

<sup>41</sup> Mumtaz Ahmad, "Islamic Fundamentalism in South Asia," in Martin Marty and Scott Appleby, eds., *Fundamentalisms Observed*, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1991.

<sup>42</sup> For details see Azhat Abbas, "Sectarianism: The Players and the Game," (Islamabad: South Asia Partnership February 2002), 7-9.

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<sup>43</sup> Owen Bennett Jones, *Pakistan: Eye of the Storm*, (Lahore: Vanguard, 2002), 253.

<sup>44</sup> Joe Stephens and David Ottaway, "The ABCs of Jihad in Afghanistan: Violent Soviet-Era Textbooks Complicate Afghan Education Efforts," *The Washington Post*, (March 23, 2002), A01. Cited in International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism, and the Military," 13.

<sup>45</sup> International Crisis Group, "Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military."

<sup>46</sup> See, for example, Nazir Sadiq, "Jehad vs Terrorism: In perspective of Kashmir issue," n.p, n.d. Sadiq argues, against Maulana Fazal Mohammad, that the private Muslim armies are un-Islamic.

<sup>47</sup> Mohammad Farooq Khan, President Dainish Sara, Mardan, interview, January 1, 2003.

<sup>48</sup> See Muhammad Qasim Zaman, "Religious Education and the Rhetoric of Reform: The Madrasa in British India and Pakistan," *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 41: 2, (April 1999) and Muhammad Qasim Zaman, *The Ulama in Contemporary Islam: Custodians of Change*, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002).

<sup>49</sup> Abdul Jalil Jan, Secretary of Information, Jamiat-Ulema-i-Islam, Northwest Frontier Province, Peshawar, interview, December 31, 2002, Niaz Mohammad, Principal, Karachi Model Deeni Madrassah, Karachi, interview, January 4, 2003, and Abdul Baqi Farooqi, Madrassah Talimul, Karachi, interview, January 4, 2003.

<sup>50</sup> R. A. Farooq, *Education System in Pakistan: Issues and Problems*, (Islamabad: Asia Society for Promotion of Innovation and Reform in Education, 1994).

<sup>51</sup> See further Christopher Candland, "Institutional Impediments to Human Development in Pakistan," in Amita Shastri and A. Jeyaratnam Wilson, eds., *The Post-Colonial States of South Asia: Democracy, Development, and Identity*, London: Curzon Press, 2001.

<sup>52</sup> See further Jean Dréze and Amartya Sen, "Education as a Basic Right" in *India: Economic Development and Social Opportunity*, New York: Oxford University Press (revised edition), 2002.

<sup>53</sup> Christopher Candland, *The Afghan Crisis*, New York: Church World Service, 1988.