

SECURITY IMPEDIMENTS TO REGIONALISM IN SOUTH ASIA

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Regional integration efforts in South Asia remain stymied by interstate conflicts, internal challenges to domestic development, and global powers' security interests in the region. Key factors include India's asymmetric size and power, relative to the other South Asian states, and the capture of states' region-focused agendas—notably those of Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—by territorial, religious, and ethnocentric interests.

Meanwhile, India's recent rise heralds both promise and danger for the future stability of this fragile region. On the one hand, India's leaders can use their position to help muster the collective will to make the difficult political decisions needed to stabilize the region. On the other hand, they may assert that their past decisions are immutable and that the rest of South Asia should adjust to India. Both stances are observed, leaving the region's future uncertain.² Pakistan and, to an extent, Bhutan and Nepal have sought to balance India's power by making alliances both interregional and external (as in the case of Pakistan's alliance with the United States and all-weather friendship with China).³ India alleges that its smaller neighbors are also supporting cross-border ethnic tensions that further destabilize the region. India, in effect, serves as a hub of power to weaker nations, all of which have long-standing problems to resolve with it.

In this asymmetric environment, security concerns are the primary obstacle to integration. While some blame the region's fragmentation on Indian policy, few would dispute that, as of 2010, the security disputes between India and Pakistan are at the heart of the problem.

Accordingly, three main themes will be explored in this chapter, which focuses on the population centers of South Asia: Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan. First, India's economic rise has coincided somewhat accidentally with increasingly complex regional security issues such as violent extremism, water resource competition, increased migration, and nuclear weapons development. These and other issues challenge both India's political position and the region's prospects for integration. Second, some South Asian countries, notably Pakistan, fear a rising India based on India's past strategic behavior, but are so overwhelmed by their own internal security situations that they have little resources to expend toward regional security. The list of such countries has shortened with time, in part because most of the smaller countries have acquiesced to India playing a role in their security. It is, however, a variable list, with frequent entries and

exits by countries such as Bhutan, Nepal, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka. (As of 2010, the major responsibility for counterbalancing India seems to lie with Pakistan.) Third, international pressures, particularly the security interests of global powers, have thus far not provided individual countries with incentives to act in ways that might enhance regionalism and improve regional security.

In this chapter, I first assess the current state of security in the region, summarizing domestic and international crises, some of which continue to overwhelm the governments overseeing them. I then discuss India's rise in economic and political terms, and—based on the assumption that the success of South Asian regionalism primarily depends on India—I explore the strategic security choices that would promote regionalism. Also analyzed is the influence that major powers have on the development of South Asian security, using U.S. policy as an example. I conclude by making a case for the future of South Asian regionalism based on India's likely stance and its neighbors' likely responses.

The Current State of Regional Security in South Asia

South Asia has had a turbulent history of interstate rivalry and state consolidation. But, while India has stabilized with time, the woes of India's neighbors have only grown, with eruptions of internal strife and a lack of adequate mechanisms to contain it. In this chapter I argue that India's reluctance to promote regionalism is also responsible, in part, for the increase in its neighbors' security problems. To some of these countries, notably Pakistan, India's objective appears to be regional hegemony.⁴ In the post-Cold War era, India has been both conciliatory and aggressive. The "Gujral doctrine," for example, prompted India's most conciliatory stance and notably improved relations with Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Pakistan.⁵ The doctrine recommends engagement with India's smaller neighbors on the basis of non-reciprocity. It envisages "walking more than half the distance" in the pursuit of conflict resolution, envisioning India's rise on the wave of regional success.⁶ In contrast, the "Gandhi doctrine" focuses on conserving India's energies by engaging the major global powers, and reconnection with the region and Indian Ocean littorals. This school of thought asks that India maintain a dominant posture and assertive policy toward its neighbors.

A key question here is whether India will act in its own interests—and pull the region along in its wake—or serve to facilitate greater regional integration. Outside factors undoubtedly play a role: globalizing trends, some Indian scholars believe, will "facilitate the integration of the region under Indian primacy."⁷ The world's increasing economic interdependence could make traditional interstate security issues irrelevant. On the other hand, the challenges faced in South Asia are staggering and divisive, with terrorism and rising religious extremism being added to competing demand for energy, water, and food. As its economy has grown, India's attempts to walk alone—and ahead of its neighbors—have aggravated historic tensions, with Pakistan in particular. These are further

compounded by intermittent terrorist attacks, for which India blames Pakistan, and the unresolved status of Kashmir.

Interstate Security Issues

Disputes over postcolonial state formation have evolved into seemingly irreconcilable divides. British imperial rule gathered the subcontinent into a common colonial system, but Britain's hasty retreat, instead of resolving the communal discords, created new cross-border issues that plague interstate relations even today.⁸ Three issues overlaid differences between India and Pakistan over the ideology of the two-nation theory: Jammu and Kashmir; the distribution of assets at Partition; and the traumatic experience of the bloody migration of the people.⁹ Similarly, the discord between Sri Lanka and India over the rights of Tamil nationals, including plantation workers, eventually resulted in a civil war that lasted nearly thirty years. The dispute between Bangladesh and India relates more to migration of East Bangladeshis, as well as water disputes. These are only three of the most outstanding examples. The bitterness generated between the ruling elites of the two major South Asian states—India and Pakistan—have gravely disrupted the cohesion forged in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Indeed, the fact that Pakistan and Bangladesh are the severed limbs of what was once a united India under the British Raj speaks to the unique religious, ethnic, and linguistic complexities of the region.

Cross-border security issues not only remain largely unresolved but also became complicated over a period of time. Kashmir, for example, not only became a symbol of difference in ideology, but also of national identity.¹⁰ And in some ways, the legacy of Partition's violent events still affect the policies of Pakistan and India.¹¹ Consequently, the two states have focused on both internal balancing (modernizing their armed forces and going nuclear) and external balancing (that is, forging alliances or "treaties of friendship" with great powers).¹² These moves have, in turn, contributed to the hardening of their respective stances on conflict resolution and the increasing frequency of cross-border crises. The nuclear capabilities of each only exacerbate the tensions inherent between the two countries, catalyzing yet more unilateral internal security-building measures. These capabilities have on the one hand contained crises and prevented major wars (deterrence optimism), but on the other, failed to prevent a series of military crises and dangerous confrontations (proliferation pessimism).¹³ Meanwhile, violent extremism and terrorism imply that regional security issues are no longer the exclusive domain of any one state in the region.¹⁴ Today, terrorist acts are not only affecting societies within South Asia; their ripple effects are felt around the globe. The stakes of conflict resolution now go far beyond the simple objective of regionalism.

India-Pakistan

Of course, the dominant interstate relationship in South Asia is that between India and Pakistan. The boundaries inherited by Pakistan and Bangladesh at Partition are unnatural and defenseless, and Pakistan's major cities and strategic arteries are perilously close to the Indian border. This lack of strategic depth leaves Pakistan perennially vulnerable to potential crisis or conventional war. Afghanistan disputes Pakistan's western borders and claims the entire Pashtu belt across the border in Pakistan. Pakistan's single port of Karachi would make a naval blockade easy. Bangladesh, a delta region of major rivers and tropical jungles, is exposed on all three sides. Inherited conflicts over disputed territories, cross-border movements, and distribution of resources has created a legacy of distrust among the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) nations.

Jammu and Kashmir remain at the heart of the bitter rivalry and strategic competition between India and Pakistan. Kashmir became a seemingly irreconcilable issue after the region was split between India and Pakistan during a hurried Partition.¹⁵ The conflict surrounding the area has since been interpreted in many ways: as the unfinished business of Partition, as a freedom struggle for the right of self-determination, as a territorial boundary dispute, a water-distribution dispute, a proxy war, and an excuse for cross-border terrorism.¹⁶ Fundamentally, it remains the problem of a divided people, expressed in a military standoff along the Line of Control (LOC), now in its sixtieth year of eyeball-to-eyeball confrontation. No regional dispute in contemporary times has involved the investment of so much human and economic capital.¹⁷ At another level, Kashmir now represents the diametrically opposed ideology between India and Pakistan. India claims Kashmir as the torchbearer of secularism even though the powerful influence of hardline Hindus remains effective in Indian polity. It therefore sees relinquishing the Muslim-dominated region as an anathema to its constitutional mandate.¹⁸ Conversely, Pakistan, which was formed on the basis of protecting the rights of South Asian Muslims, sees the absorption of Kashmir as a national duty. These diametrically opposed schools of thought dominate Indo-Pak relations and do not bode well for regionalism.¹⁹

In addition to ideology, several practical issues are at stake. The seeds of the Siachen glacier controversy were sown when both sides mutually agreed not to demarcate the LOC beyond a point on the map called NJ 9842.²⁰ From that point, the distance to the Chinese border is 65 kilometers, an area not demarcated due to its inaccessibility.²¹ Both India and Pakistan interpret the nondemarcation of this area in their own best interests.²² India's position is that the de facto LOC extends along the high crests separating watersheds.²³ According to this interpretation, the delineation would be along the Salto ridgeline to the Chinese border in the vicinity of K-2.²⁴ The Pakistani argument is that the LOC extends beyond point NJ 9842 following its previous course, which places the Siachen glacier within Pakistani-controlled territory, terminating

at the Karakoram pass.²⁵ From Pakistan's standpoint, Siachen is the eastern extremity of Baltistan, a subdivision of the Pakistani-controlled portion of the northern area that is clearly demarcated by the western boundary of the Nubra subdivision of Jammu and Kashmir's Laddakh district.²⁶ Pakistan further justifies its position by pointing out that major foreign mountaineering expeditions enter this area via Pakistan after getting formal permits.²⁷

The Kashmiri uprising against India started in 1989, at a critical historical moment following the Soviet Union's withdrawal from Afghanistan and its subsequent collapse. The Kashmiri insurgency relied primarily on Pakistan, which, since 1994, had also been supporting the Taliban insurgency in Afghanistan, enabling demobilized warriors from Afghanistan to join the Kashmiri insurgents. This strategy of fueling a low-intensity war has tied down several hundred thousand Indian forces in Kashmir in a protracted counterinsurgency. Meanwhile, for the past several years, Pakistan is alleging India's complicity from Afghanistan in a rising insurgency in Pakistan's Baluchistan province. Additionally, well-endowed Islamic extremists have now begun operating across the arc of the entire region from Bangladesh to Afghanistan.²⁸

India-Bangladesh

Since its division from India (1947) and then Pakistan (1971), Bangladesh has been a source of instability for the northeastern states of India. India's regional integration efforts and outward reach to Southeast Asia is stymied by conflicts with Bangladesh, including multiple insurgencies in India's northeast. In recent decades, despite ten years of democracy (1990–2001), rising Islamic militancy has deepened the crisis of governance in Bangladesh. Meanwhile, India alleges that terrorist attacks within its borders have connections to Bangladesh. Growing illegal immigration and cross-border movements into India have also raised tensions between the two SAARC neighbors. India has accused Bangladesh of conniving with Pakistan to destabilize India's northeast and also China of abetting insurgencies in northeastern India.²⁹ Porous borders facilitate illegal arms and narcotics trade, which in turn fund the separatist movements in India's northeast.³⁰ In opposition to Delhi's pressure on those issues, Dhaka has refused the transit of natural gas exports from the region.³¹ Foreign direct investment (FDI) by Bangladesh in India has been heavily scrutinized and has greatly slowed down (and discouraged) cross-border economic dealings.³²

India, Pakistan, and Afghanistan

Security dynamics in the borderlands of Afghanistan and Pakistan are no longer just regional issues but are now central to the global U.S.-led war on terrorism—with implications for the future of the region. The dispute goes back to 1893, when the British created a buffer between their imperial holdings and Czarist Russia. Now the border between Pakistan and Afghanistan, the

1,600-mile Durand line has been challenged by Afghans. The ethnic Pashtuns, who were divided as a result, never accepted it and treated it as if it were a “line drawn on water.”³³ Kabul refused to recognize the newly independent Pakistan; in 1947 Afghanistan cast the sole vote against Pakistan’s membership in the United Nations (UN) while laying claim to Baluchistan and the North-West Frontier Province (NWFP). Over the next decades, several clashes led to a severing of diplomatic relations between the two nations at various points in time. Then, in the 1980s, regional disputes become enmeshed in the Cold War as U.S.-supported Afghani insurgents battled their Marxist government and a Soviet invasion.³⁴

Since, both India and Pakistan have competed for influence over Afghanistan.³⁵ India accuses Pakistan of using Afghan territory for training militants that wage jihad in Kashmir, denied by Pakistan; Afghanistan accuses Pakistan of continuing to support the Taliban, a charge also denied; and Pakistan, in turn, accuses India of conniving with Afghanistan to destabilize Pakistan and stoke irredentist claims, a charge denied by both Afghanistan and India.³⁶ The presence of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and U.S. forces in the region and the suspected presence of the al-Qaeda leadership in the area seem to have increased the region’s volatility—something that was unexpected when U.S.-led forces invaded Afghanistan in 2001. As of 2010 the historical disputes, increasingly violent extremism, and abundance of terrorist havens around the tribal borderlands between Afghanistan and Pakistan have made it the front line of the war on terror.

Intrastate Security Issues

As might be expected, South Asian states, in their formative years, were more concerned with nation building than with developing external relations or state building.³⁷ The elite repeatedly overlooked the importance of developing the institutional capacity and legal accommodations necessary in the multiethnic, multireligious South Asian context.³⁸ Not surprisingly, most instances of armed conflict were intrastate rather than interstate, as is documented by several studies.³⁹ Intrastate conflict threatens each state with impending instability and is a security liability in the eyes of its neighbors.

India

After the various agitations and separatist movements of the 1950s subsided, a wave of organized insurgencies arose in the 1960s and 1970s. Generally, the violence can be categorized into two types: revolutionary and secessionist. Maoist organizations dedicated to the violent overthrow of the Indian government bloomed around the late 1960s, were largely suppressed during the 1970s, and have seen a steady increase in influence since the turn of the century. Naxalism, which typifies this movement, is still considered a serious threat to the central government’s legitimacy and has significant influence throughout much

of the country.⁴⁰ The Maoist movement, as it is called, focuses on tribal rights. Meanwhile, the Students Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), which emerged from a loosely organized group to command national attention as late as 2000, focuses on the rights of Muslim Indians.⁴¹ While these movements pose a security threat, they do not challenge the borders of the Indian state.

Since the late 1980s secessionist violence has for the most part centered on the disputed territory of Kashmir, with grave implications for India-Pakistan relations. The Sikh insurgency, also secessionist, has been active from the 1970s. Although some argue that it still retains strong organizational capacity, its primary interest, the secession of Punjab, collapsed as a popular cause in the 1980s.⁴²

Of all the insurgencies, little attention has been paid to the simmering low-intensity conflicts that plague India's northeastern states, also called the "seven sisters"; the most stubborn is in the second-largest "sister," Assam. Among other armed groups, the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA) has been active for twenty-nine years.⁴³ Problems that originated in arbitrary colonial boundaries have, through mismanagement, become regional security issues. Massive illegal immigration, much of it from Bangladesh, threatens Assamese identity and economic power.⁴⁴

In sum, leftist, ethno-nationalist, and Islamist organizations have continued to survive amid India's economic liberalization and political decentralization. There is also strong anti-globalization sentiment in some parts of the country.⁴⁵ Rooted in decades of socialist, inward-looking policies, the country has cultivated a generational dependency on the welfare schemes of the central government. The vast numbers of the population who live below and just above the poverty line wield significant political power in the democracy. Even though stronger regional relationships would extend and broaden the economic gains of late, the risk posed by lower government protections against neighboring markets may be too much for the masses to accept.

Pakistan

Pakistan's state-formation issues are similarly complex. That nation building was prioritized over state building is evident, for example, in the push for Urdu as the national language. In 1954 the sacking of a top pro-Bengali politician by Pakistan's governor-general institutionalized authoritarian intervention in the name of nationalism.⁴⁶ Although Pakistan's two wings—East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) and West Pakistan (today's Pakistan)—were geographically divided, with India in between, there were centrifugal tendencies from its birth. Pakistan's two western provinces, the NWFP and Baluchistan, were initially wary of joining the new state, but they were coerced and persuaded into doing so (Pashtun and Baluch subnationalism is ongoing). The Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) around the Afghanistan borderlands retain their autonomous stature to date, now legitimized in Pakistan's constitution. Added to this is the ongoing conflict with India over Kashmir.

Pakistan has focused most on the existential threat posed by India. This security imperative has forced Pakistan into external balancing, but even its long-standing alliance with the world's most powerful nations (United States and China) has not redressed Pakistani security concerns. Instead, Pakistan's reliance on U.S. support during its formative years—a counterbalance to the perceived threat of Indian hegemony—discouraged the development of state institutions in favor of the substantial and direct empowerment of the Pakistani military.⁴⁷ Triangulating statehood with religion (national identity) and ethnicity (subnationalism) was and remains a challenge of the first order. The result is a fundamental clash between the state and society—with no easy answer. Now, added to its history of weak state institutions and strained civil-military relations is the impact of 9/11—further dividing the interests of civil society from national security imperatives. This is unlikely to change in the near term. Ethnic crises in Sindh and Baluchistan continue to pose a problem in Pakistan, where threats of subnationalism do not subside.⁴⁸ Baluchistan's simmering state of low-level insurgency and unrest—ongoing for years—peaked as recently as 2006. The area is critical because of its strategic location as a corridor for energy pipelines and because its coastline has the potential to affect future trade in the region, alleviating or instigating new regional security concerns.

As the cases of India and Pakistan illustrate, even the stronger South Asian states suffer from serious intrastate issues. Some such problems—such as Kashmir's status—have interstate dimensions, further complicating the situation and making regional cooperation more unlikely.

India's Economic and Geopolitical Rise

India's economic and consequent geopolitical rise has occurred in a fairly short period of time. Apart from its responses to the dictates of a market economy—open to global influences since the economic reforms of the early 1990s—there are several political factors supporting its ascendance. First of these is India's robust democratic institutions, inherited from the British colonial system.⁴⁹ Jawaharlal Nehru, India's first prime minister, remained the leader of the country for seventeen years, which helped sustain India's democracy even though he followed a strong centralist policy designed to mitigate separatist trends. The second factor is India's relative geopolitical insularity. The Indian Ocean, the Himalayas, and the nations of Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Nepal act as buffers protecting it from direct outside threat. While Partition physically separated India from the Persian Gulf, Central Asia, and Southeast Asia on the one hand, on the other it allowed India to escape the consequences of the rough border dynamics of Afghanistan in Central Asia and the instabilities of the tropical jungles to India's east.⁵⁰ Except for a border problem with its strongest neighbor, China, which led to a brief war in 1962, the relatively powerful Indian military has found itself unmatched at borders with weaker nations' smaller militaries.

Third is the systemic change that India underwent when the Cold War ended, marking the end of its dependence on the Soviet Union. Post-Cold War India was seen as “a political West” outside Western countries: a multiethnic, multireligious country with the credentials of being a sustained democracy.⁵¹ It has been able to leverage this identity to obtain the FDI and other support essential for its growth in a globalizing world economy. The fourth factor is India’s soft power, manifest in a vibrant culture and a business-oriented society. The nation’s economic turnaround post-Cold War is truly remarkable. After decades of autarky and sluggish performance, India’s newly globalized economy successfully leveraged skills in information technology (IT) at the dawn of the information age. India’s rise must also be seen in the context of its relations with Pakistan. In 1986–1987 the Indian army decided to challenge Pakistan in the famous military crisis known as Operation Brass Tacks, which followed India’s surprise occupation of the Siachen Glacier, another significant crisis, just two years earlier. Both events brought the two countries to the brink of war, prompting quiet U.S. diplomacy to diffuse the tension. Soon after, rigged state elections in Jammu and Kashmir boiled over into an insurgency, which was exploited by Pakistan through military and financial support. This crisis, too, led both countries to the brink of war in 1990, an event which still overshadows Indo-Pak relations. These crises laid the foundations for two more: one in Kargil 1999 and another, compound crisis (Operation Parakaram), 2001–2002.

Meanwhile, India’s rise confronted that of China. Concurrent with Operation Brass Tacks, India launched another exercise—code-named Chequer Board—in the Sumduru Chu Valley that nearly erupted into a full-scale border clash with China. Several other incidents had already cast doubt on the future relations of the world’s two most populous nations. The first was India’s upgrading of the North-East Frontier Agency (NEFA) to the state of Arunachal Pradesh in December 1986. This implied that the disputed territory was absorbed into the Indian state. This incurred strong protest from Beijing, which charged that India had “seriously violated” China’s territorial integrity and sovereignty. The second was the 1986–1987 border standoff in Sumduru Chu in the eastern sector, where both sides deployed large number of troops and which almost escalated into an open conflict.⁵²

India has, however, made progress in establishing itself as the key power on the Indian Ocean. This goes back to India’s investments in naval power in the 1980s. In 1988 an attempted coup against President Gayoom of the Maldives prompted the Indian navy to send a task force to provide support. The amphibious intervention intended to restore the government. The Maldives, a state of multiple archipelagos, was insignificant from a security point of view; but the political success, including accolades from Washington, encouraged India’s regional intervention and probably created the foundation for India’s blue-water navy. Subsequently, South Asia has witnessed an emergence of Indian naval power and positive security roles in piracy, trafficking, and disaster relief.

By far the most muscular display of India's geopolitical power was its intervention in Sri Lanka, which was done in a manner that recalls America's enactment of the Monroe Doctrine. After years of abetting the Tamil insurgency in Sri Lanka, India decided to reverse its policy by introducing a peace accord between the Tamils and the incumbent Sinhalese regime and by cracking down on Tamil militancy. India signed the peace accord, which formalized India's commitment to end support to the Tamil insurgency by denying its own territory as a refuge and financing center for insurgents. Overall, the accord was humiliating to many Sri Lankans,⁵³ as it reflected what appeared to be India's hegemonic attitude toward the tiny island, blatantly undermining Sri Lankan sovereignty (as demonstrated in follow-up letters from Rajiv Gandhi to President J. R. Jayewardene).⁵⁴ The Indian peacekeeping intervention failed to subdue the Tamil insurgents, and India finally had to withdraw in the face of growing domestic insurgencies.

From the above analysis, it appears that India has, though somewhat tentatively, sought to leverage its growing economic strength to achieve regional political dominance. This is how a regional hegemony—undoubtedly a term laden with all sorts of undesirable implications—is defined. While still disputed, it should also be clear, as many chapters in this volume conclude,⁵⁵ that India's centrality is probably inevitable. Properly used, the power implied by India's position can be a strong and positive force for development. But this power has not always been so utilized; in the case of Pakistan, for example, India's attitude has almost invariably been counterproductive, while the opposite, as employed during the brief period of the Gujral doctrine, has been beneficial.⁵⁶

Efforts to Resolve the India-Pakistan Conflict

Despite their contentious and rigid positions, India and Pakistan have made significant efforts to resolve cross-border issues whenever the moment seemed ripe to do so. At least four such moments can be cited: Tashkent in 1966, Simla in 1972, Lahore in 1999, and Islamabad in 2004.⁵⁷ Made after the 1971 war, the historic Simla Agreement of 1972 is still central to the commitment that binds both countries to seek a peaceful resolution. In particular, Article 4 obliges both sides to respect the LOC “without prejudice to the recognized position of either side.”⁵⁸ Since 1997 India and Pakistan have been engaged in composite dialogue, which broke off after Kargil 1999 but was reiterated in a joint statement of President Musharraf and Prime Minister Vajpayee on January 6, 2004.⁵⁹

In 2008 two developments occurred. First was the peaceful uprising in Kashmir in the late summer of 2008, which India suppressed by force. The second was the Mumbai terror attacks, which stalled all dialogue.⁶⁰ The dialogue resumed in February 25, 2010, but made no substantive progress. Earlier, on May 21, 2008, Pakistani foreign minister Shah Mahmood Qureshi and Indian

external affairs minister Pranab Mukherjee had met to review the progress made in the fourth round of the composite dialogue. This ministerial-level meeting was preceded by a meeting between the foreign secretaries of both sides, Pakistan's Salman Bashir and India's Shivshankar Menon, on May 20, 2008. Before the Mumbai attacks the positions of both India and Pakistan were outlined on a number of issues, summarized below.

Kashmir

According to a joint statement, both sides agreed to refrain from adopting hostile propaganda on the issue of terrorism and agreed that

[T]o increase the frequency of Muzaffarabad Srinagar and Rawalkot-Poonch Bus service from a fortnightly to a weekly basis; to finalize modalities for intra-Kashmir trade and truck service as early as possible; to implement other measures to expand and facilitate travel a meeting of the Working Group on Cross-LOC CBMs would be convened within two months.⁶¹

An important dimension of the Kashmir problem pertains to river flows, as nearly all rivers flowing into Pakistan have their origin in Kashmir. In 1960 arbitration by the World Bank resulted in the Indus Water Basin Treaty. This treaty has survived several wars and military crises. But the construction of the Baglihar dam upstream in Indian Kashmir, which Pakistan believes to be in violation of the treaty 1960, has exacerbated the issue. The Baglihar dam controversy erupted when India dismissed Pakistani objections to the dam's design and Pakistan referred the issue to a World Bank tribunal. The World Bank's decision was that it would allow India to construct the dam, but partially accept Pakistan's objections as well. This dispute has added another layer of distrust to India-Pakistan relations, with direct implications for the prospects of regionalism as Pakistan strengthens its belief that India is unprepared to concede anything not to its advantage.

The Siachen Glacier

According to Shivshankar Menon, the former Indian foreign secretary and current national security adviser to the prime minister of India, considerable progress has been made by both the sides on the issues of Sir Creek and Siachen. The issue of Sir Creek is a dispute between India and Pakistan over their boundary along a creek that adjoins the delta region of the India and Pakistan border. The demarcation of the Sir Creek boundary would have eventually created a focal point from where the maritime boundaries between India and Pakistan could be delineated in the future. According to Menon: "In Siachen, we have to deal with environmental consequences and explore the possibilities of mountain climbing. Another proposal is to make it a mountain of peace and

in the Sir Creek case, a lot of progress has been made. We have completed a joint survey and have a common map now.”⁶² According to a joint statement of May 21, 2008, “Both sides exchanged views on Siachen and reiterated their commitment to seeking an early amicable solution.”

Baglihar and Other Dams

No settlements have been made since the composite dialogue started in 2004. After the fourth round of composite dialogue, although no reference was made to progress on the Wuller barrage and Baglihar dam, the Pakistani Indus water commissioner, Jamat Ali Shah, and his Indian counterpart, Oranga Nathan, stated in a joint press conference held on May 31, 2008, that both Pakistan and India have allowed each other to inspect the Baglihar dam and Neelum-Jhelum Hydropower Project. According to the Associated Press of Pakistan, “India has assured Pakistan that the Baglihar Dam is being built in line with the recommendations of the neutral expert’s commission.”⁶³ Furthermore, Jamat Ali Shah stated, “Pakistan had also pointed out that the Indian design for the dam was structurally unsafe. Pakistan had reservations over the storage capacity of the proposed dam, diversion of a river over which the dam was to be constructed and the de-silting process,” adding that Pakistan also had reservations on the Indian formula of water storage.⁶⁴

Meanwhile, India has expedited work on the Kishanganga water project, citing that Pakistan was also constructing a power project on its side of the same river (named River Neelum in Pakistan).⁶⁵ Moreover, the Indian union minister for power, Jairam Ramesh, was quoted as saying that the “National Hydroelectric Power Corporation (NHPC) will have to work faster on the Kishanganga power project in wake of Islamabad’s efforts to complete the Neelum-Jhelum project on the other side of the LOC by 2015.” However, he admitted that the stand-off between India and Pakistan over the two projects has geo-strategic implications.⁶⁶ Indian concern about the Pakistani project also stemmed from the fact that “over 2,000 Chinese engineers would be working very close to the LOC for the next eight years.”⁶⁷

An optimistic note may be struck from the above analyses. Despite the passage of time, there have been recurring talks during which both sides appeared to make progress. While in the Western press Pakistan appears to be on the wrong side of history as an Islamic nation, it continues to push for closer engagement with the United States even as it prioritizes the Kashmiri cause. As such, Pakistan hopes to raise awareness that the Kashmiri insurgency is not just “cross-border terrorism,” even as India refuses to go beyond a bilateral approach. The attitude of President Obama’s administration toward Kashmir is likely to be muted as it tackles what are, from the U.S. viewpoint, the more serious problems of the global economic downturn and the Taliban and al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. Meanwhile, Pakistan sees the prospects of Indian hegemony on the ascendant, a predicament summed up by Henry Sokolski as follows:

Pakistan now has to be concerned not just about maintaining good relations with Washington, but somehow fending off the encircling efforts of India. Most recently, these activities included formal military-to-military ties with Iran; the construction of a major naval port at Chahbahar near Pakistan's own new naval base at Gwador; the joint construction with Iran of roads to Afghanistan (and Indian aid efforts to Afghanistan); the stationing of Indian intelligence officers at Zahedan, Iran close to Baluchistan rebel activities in Pakistan; the creation of an Indian air base in Tajikistan; Indian energy investments and commerce with Iran and other Gulf countries; and continued Indian military, nuclear, and rocket enhancements. All of these developments have put Pakistan's military and political officials on edge.⁶⁸

International Influence on India's Regional Policies

This section examines the role of the United States in South Asian regional security. China and the Soviet Union (and Russia to a lesser extent) do wield and have wielded their influence, too. Sometimes their policies were specifically to balance or counter those of the United States in Pakistan, India, or Afghanistan. Documenting all the strategic movements of the major powers goes beyond the scope of this chapter, which only strives to characterize how erratic and misguided major power involvements have adversely affected long-term regional security. Reviewing the U.S. policies in South Asia accomplishes this aim.

The Legacy of U.S. Intervention

U.S. policies have had a paradoxical impact on the South Asian region. The United States played a critical role, often underappreciated in the region, in bolstering Pakistan's survival as a nation, especially in the initial decades of its existence. U.S. military and economic support was central to Pakistani national confidence by the early 1960s.⁶⁹ Overall, however, the manner in which the United States pursued its own security interests inadvertently risked the regional integration process. This section will explain how the U.S. policy of balancing India and Pakistan caused security dilemmas within the region and affected the attitudes of regional players. The implication is that shortsighted policies impeded rather than promoted harmony and peace in the region.

U.S. foreign policy has generally shifted priorities based on perceived threats. South Asia specifically has been a marginal and strategic backwater for most of the second half of the twentieth century. The U.S. episodic focus on South Asia hardened the position of states and inadvertently compounded conflict resolution—thus obstructing regional integration.⁷⁰

With two wings separated by a hostile India, a nascent Pakistan fought a war over Kashmir in the midst of the traumatic conditions unleashed by Partition. Pakistan faced enormous challenges early on, especially in defense of its territory. According to an American assessment, by the time a ceasefire

along the LOC in Kashmir had been reached in 1949, the 137,000 Pakistani troops that were facing a 640,000-strong Indian army were “barely sufficient to meet the existing demands of [Pakistan’s] internal security.”⁷¹ Pakistan was simultaneously confronted by another unfriendly neighbor: Afghanistan decided to renege on the border agreement of 1893 with the British through a parliamentary resolution, having earlier vetoed Pakistani membership to the United Nations on the same basis. This step essentially implied a reclaiming of the Pashtu belt of Pakistan’s western provinces. This Pashtunistan movement, as it became known at the time, was abetted and encouraged by India. Jinnah, a great admirer of the United States, made desperate requests to the United States, which were repeatedly turned down⁷² because Washington’s focus was on India at the time; meanwhile, the Indian military received due attention from the U.S. State Department.⁷³

Two events changed the U.S. focus: the Korean War and South Asian security developments. In 1951, amidst a military standoff with India; domestic political crises, including a threat of a communist coup (the Rawalpindi Conspiracy Case); and the assassination of Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan became important to Washington. Earlier, Pakistan’s willingness to send troops to Korea—even as India proved unwilling—had left a positive impression on U.S. policymakers. Finally, in the 1950s, during President Eisenhower’s administration, Pakistan became a formal member of the U.S.-led collective security arrangement involving a series of entangling alliances promoted by the United States to contain the spread of Communism. India was pursuing a nonaligned policy, but its inward-looking and leftist policies were more compatible with Communism, so it leaned toward the Soviet Union. For U.S. policymakers, Pakistan formed an essential part of the “northern tier of the Middle East.”⁷⁴ Pakistan, on the other hand, saw the U.S. alliance as a means to balance its structural asymmetry with India. Regardless of their reasonings, Pakistan was not only standing on its own feet by the mid-1960s but was a model state boasting an average of 6 percent annual growth of its gross domestic product (GDP), despite unsettling political events within the country.⁷⁵ In the next four decades, wars, crises, and insurrections weakened the U.S. incentive to proactively involve itself in regional affairs, thereby dampening the potential for regional conflict resolution.

U.S. Roles: Objectives and Consequences

Armed with incoherent policies that did not reflect any cohesive strategy in the region, the United States failed to find a “regional supporter state in South Asia that would steward U.S. interests in the region.”⁷⁶ These failed policies alone did not trigger regional problems, but Washington’s approach to the region, even armed with the best of intentions, inadvertently hindered regional stability. The United States’ commitment in the Cold War forced it to think of South Asia as a strategic backwater. Indian dominance was evident but there were

large disputes leading to major regional crises. Propping up India as a regional hegemon would have required intense U.S. engagement in the region, which was further complicated by India's nonaligned independent position, as well its close alliance with the Soviet Union. These factors made any involvement a much more complicated exercise than Washington wanted. India, on the other hand, abhorred outside intervention and insisted on bilateral solutions to regional issues. This brought neither conflict resolution nor regional acceptance of India as a leader. An accepted hegemony required either absence of outside influence or acceptance of outside mediators when conflicting parties were unable to find a common denominator.⁷⁷ India's forays into regional hegemony have been unevenly supported by the United States, and its strategic behavior has not encouraged trust and support from its smaller neighbors.

In the 1980s, while Pakistan's importance as a front-line state was enhanced due to the Soviet Union's engagement in Afghanistan, the Reagan administration tacitly fed India's ambitions, hoping they would bolster U.S. strategic interests in the region. India was encouraged to assert itself with all its neighbors (Sri Lanka, for example), but this ended up having negative rather than positive consequences for regional security. India had no economic clout to offer its unequal neighbors, nor the political will to scale down its maximalist negotiating position. India's military exercises (Brass Tacks and Checker Board, for example, 1986–87) only exacerbated tensions, and thus the region suffers to date.

U.S. Encouragement of a Regional Approach

Twice the United States appointed a person to facilitate crises in the South Asian region, leading to possible conflict resolution and regional integration. First, in the 1960s, President Kennedy appointed Averell Harriman in the wake of the Sino-Indian crises; Harriman attempted to negotiate a Kashmir settlement. (The role of Ambassador Harriman ended with President Kennedy's death.) Then in 1998 President Clinton appointed Strobe Talbott, first to manage the crises following the nuclear tests and second to negotiate U.S. policy toward the region.

Strobe Talbot's engagement with India (and lack of it with Pakistan) was a turning point and laid the groundwork for an India-centric U.S. policy in the region.⁷⁸ The new U.S. regional policy of delinking India and Pakistan, based on the size and role of each country, made sense on one level; but nuclear weapons in the midst of a complex security situation and an intertwined geography "interlock the fate of the region."⁷⁹ The new U.S. regional policy hardened India's attitude toward its neighbors, reinforcing India's contention that they were failed states and that even equating India with them was an insult. India's regional ambition has since grown into a belief that it is now in the big leagues, with no incentive for magnanimity.

Since 9/11 Pakistan has become a front-line state in the war against terrorism. But unlike the Cold War era, when South Asia's importance was derivative to Soviet and American strategic behavior, the region now has direct relevance for

international security. This has opened the door for major powers as well as the international community at large to reassess their South Asian policies in a new light. Instead of assisting or shunning individual countries in a bid to enhance their own interests, there exists an opportunity to break from traditional policies and engage in cooperative dialogues designed to enhance the prospects of long-term stability, sacrificing—at most—some short-term political gains.

Conclusion: The Future of South Asian Regionalism and Security

Interstate and intrastate issues, cross-border tensions, and the inconsistent interests of global powers in the region have shaped the architecture of regional security and obstructed regional integration. In this chapter I argue that India has been an unsteady proponent of South Asian regionalism, driven by its own varying assessments of its role in the region. This has meant that, on occasion, it has sought to exert its political will across borders. India's involvement has sometimes been accepted by its neighbors, either explicitly, such as in Nepal's treaties with India, or implicitly, such as in Sri Lanka's request for Indian help in the mid-1980s. At other times, and particularly in relation to India's unresolved issues with Pakistan, such behavior has been deemed unacceptable. At the same time, India's economic rise promises regional benefits if it exerts its political will with the idea of helping development. This will undoubtedly require sacrifices on all sides. Meanwhile, India-Pakistan tensions remain unabated, even as other countries in South Asia have accepted India's economic dominance and are keen to work with it to improve their own conditions. Properly shaped U.S., Russian, and Chinese policies can encourage South Asian countries to modify their strategic behavior toward their neighbors, thereby enhancing the region's global standing, strategic stability, and long-term security.

Notes

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² Former Indian foreign secretary Saran has stated, "Our neighbors should view us as an opportunity, not as a threat"; see also Saurabh Shukla, "Trouble in the Backyard; with Six of its Neighbours Ranking High on a Global Roster of Failed States, there is a Renewed Warning for India to Reassess its Policy Towards Them and Safeguard its Own Strategic Interests," *India Today*, May 2006, 68.

³ Praful Bidwai, "India: World Influence Buys New Delhi Little in its Own Back Yard," *Global Information Network*, March 23, 2006, 1.

⁴ Manjeet Singh Pardesi, "Deducing India's Grand Strategy of Regional Hegemony from Historical and Conceptual Perspectives," Draft Working Paper 76, Institute of

Defense and Strategic Studies, Singapore, April 2005, www.ntu.edu.sg/rsis/publications/workingpapers.asp?selYear=2005.

⁵ See also Sohban, chapter 4, and Kelegama, chapter 8, in this volume.

⁶ C. Raja Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon: The Shaping of India's New Foreign Policy* (New Delhi: Viking, 2004), 156.

⁷ Mohan, *Crossing the Rubicon*, 155–56.

⁸ For a detailed account of the hurried departure of Britain, see Stanley Wolpert, *Shameful Flight* (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 2006).

⁹ The rationale of the two-nation theory was that the Muslims in the subcontinent claimed entitlement to a separate nation-state because of the belief that their distinct culture, religious practices, and way of life would be fundamentally affected under a Hindu dominated system. They claimed nationhood based on geographic continuity of Muslim populations in the northwest, northeast, and south of India. In 1947 the British accepted the demand of the Muslim League, which became the basis of the Partition of India and Pakistan. The question of princely states remained undecided at the time of partition. One such state, Jammu and Kashmir, became the bone of contention between the two countries. For details see Victoria Schofield, *Kashmir and Conflict, India, Pakistan and the Unfinished War* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2000).

¹⁰ For a comprehensive analysis, see Vali Nasr, “National Identities and the India-Pakistan,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T. V. Paul (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2005), 178–201.

¹¹ Rifaat Hussain, “The India-Pakistan Peace Process,” *Defense & Security Analysis* 22, no. 4 (2006): 409.

¹² Stephen P. Cohen, *India: Emerging Power* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2001), 204, 209–11.

¹³ Scott D. Sagan and Kenneth N. Waltz, *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: A Debate Renewed* (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, Inc., 2003).

¹⁴ Right-wing politics in both India and Pakistan generate religious hatred and extremist ideological positions. A ritual cleaning act was performed by Jamiat-i-Islami and Shiv Sena, respectively, after Prime Minister Vajpayee's visit to the Pakistan Monument in 1999 and President Musharraf's visit to the Gandhi Memorial in 2001. See Rizwan Zeb and Suba Chandran, “Indo-Pak Conflicts Ripe to Resolve,” *RCSS Policy Studies* 34, Regional Center for Strategic Studies, Colombo, 2005, 23.

¹⁵ See Wolpert, *Shameful Flight*.

¹⁶ For themes in Kashmiri nationalism, see Maya Chadda, *Ethnicity, Security and Separatism in India*, (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1997), 49–76. Also see Stephen M. Saideman, “At the Heart of the Conflict: Irredentism in Kashmir,” in *The India-Pakistan Conflict: An Enduring Rivalry*, ed. T. V. Paul, 202–24.

¹⁷ For an analysis of the cost of India and Pakistan rivalry, see Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Mahmud Ali Durrani, *India and Pakistan: The Cost of Conflict, The Benefits of Peace* (Washington, D.C.: The Johns Hopkins Univ. Press, 2000). For a critique of Pakistan security policy, see Ahmad Faruqui, *Rethinking the National Security of Pakistan: The Price of Strategic Myopia* (Burlington, VA: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2003).

¹⁸ For a detailed account read Sumit Ganguly, *Conflict Unending: India-Pakistan Tensions since 1947* (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2001). Also see Robert G. Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2003), 137–81.

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¹⁹ See Robert G. Wirsing, *Kashmir in the Shadow of War: Regional Rivalries in a Nuclear Age* (New York: M. E. Sharpe Inc., 2003), 137–81.

²⁰ The demarcation is delineated as “From Delunang onwards the cease-fire line (CFL) will follow the general line (Point 15495), Ishmam, Manus, Gangam Gunderman (Point 13620), Junkar (Point 17628), Marmak, Natsara, Shungruti (Point 17531), Chorbat La (Point 16700), Chalunka (on the Shyok river), Khor, thence north to the glaciers.”

²¹ Robert G. Wirsing, “The Siachin Glacier Dispute: Can Diplomacy Untangle It,” *Indian Defence Review* (July 1991): 95. Also see Zafar Iqbal Cheema, “The Strategic Context of the Kargil Conflict: A Pakistani Perspective,” in *Asymmetric Warfare in South Asia: The Causes and Consequences of the Kargil Conflict*, ed. Peter R. Lavoy (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press, 2009), 48.

²² Robert G. Wirsing, *Pakistan’s Security under Zia, 1977–1988: The Policy Imperatives of Peripheral Asian State* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991), 156.

²³ Maj. Gen. (Retd.) Tariq Mahmood, “Siachin Dispute and Status of Northern Areas,” *Defence Journal* 19, nos. 5–6 (1993): 21.

²⁴ According to the Indian argument, the Saltoro Range is northwest of the great Karakoram Range, which begins at Sia Kangri and terminates at Shyok and Nubra Valley. See, for example, Jasjit Singh, “Siachin Glacier: Facts and Fiction,” *Strategic Studies* 12, no. 7 (1987): 667.

²⁵ Lt. Gen. (Retd.) M. I. Chibber, “Siachin: The Untold Story (A Personal Account),” *Indian Defence Review* (July 1989): 146.

²⁶ Raspal S. Khosa, “The Siachin Glacier Dispute; Imbroglia on the Roof of the World,” *Contemporary South Asia* 8, no. 2 (July 1999): 194.

²⁷ Wirsing, *Pakistan’s Security under Zia*, 154.

²⁸ After 9/11 Pakistan decided to eschew supporting insurgencies in the region. This change in policy resulted in a spate of suicide bombings that created unprecedented terror in the country. There were sixty-five suicide attacks in 2007 that primarily targeted the military and intelligence agencies.

²⁹ Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of Islamist Militancy in Bangladesh,” Special Report 171, United States Institute of Peace (USIP), Washington, D.C., August 2007.

³⁰ “Bangladesh: Eastward Policy Limited by India Influence,” *OxResearch*, April 25, 2003, 1.

³¹ *Ibid.*

³² Puja Mehra, “Eagle Eye On FDI; Concerned about National Security, the Centre Plans a Law to Make Foreign Investment Terror-Proof,” *India Today* (September 25, 2006): 58.

³³ Vartan Gregorian, “The Yearnings of the Pakhtoons,” *New York Times* (November 15, 2001), 31, and earlier work by the same author, *The Emergence of Modern Afghanistan: Politics of Reform and Modernization, 1880–1946* (Stanford, CA: Stanford Univ. Press, 1969).

³⁴ For a comprehensive analysis of the war against Soviet occupation in Afghanistan, see Coll, Steve, *Ghost Wars* (New York: Penguin, 2004).

³⁵ The fourth regional player is Iran, with strategic interests in Afghanistan. Pakistan fears encirclement and strategic networking among the three countries.

³⁶ Henry D. Sokolski, ed., *Pakistan’s Nuclear Future: Worries Beyond War* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Army War College, January 2008), 3.

³⁷ Sumantra Bose, “Decolonization and State Building in South Asia,” *Journal of International Affairs* 58, no. 1 (2004): 95–114.

³⁸ Intrastate conflict is defined as armed conflict between two groups, of which one is the state, and in which violence is used by either or both parties resulting in human and material casualties. Suba Chandran, “Intrastate Armed Conflicts in South Asia: Impact on Regional Security,” in *Comprehensive Security in South Asia*, ed. Dev Raj Dahal and Nishchal Nath Pandey (New Delhi: Manohar Publishers, 2006), 159.

³⁹ Chandran, “Intrastate Armed Conflicts in South Asia,” 159–75.

⁴⁰ As a testament to the scale of the problem, in April 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh stated that the Naxalites were the “single biggest internal security challenge” ever faced by the country. See “India Politics: Naxalites Pose Internal Security Threat,” *EIU ViewsWire*, New York, October 25, 2006.

⁴¹ “Student’s Islamic Movement of India (SIMI),” *South Asia Terrorism Portal*, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/terroristoutfits/simi.htm.

⁴² *Ibid.*

⁴³ “In the first half of 2007 alone, Indian Ministry of Home Affairs reported 156 insurgency-related incidents took place in Assam between January 1, 2007, and March 31, 2007. ULFA was accused of carrying out 68 attacks in upper Assam between January 1, 2007, and June 10, 2007, killing 81 civilians, and 11 soldiers.” *South Asian Terrorism Portal*, www.satp.org/satporgtp/countries/india/states/assam/timelines/index.html.

⁴⁴ Sumit Ganguly, “The Rise of Islamists Militancy in Bangladesh,” USIP, August 2007.

⁴⁵ Sadanand Dhume, “Is India an Ally?” *Commentary* 125 (2008): 25–30; and Shoba S. Rajgopal, “Reclaiming Democracy? The Anti-Globalization Movement in South Asia,” *Feminist Review* 70 (2002): 134–37.

⁴⁶ Bose, “Decolonization and State Building in South Asia,” 95–114.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*

⁴⁸ Subrata K. Mitra and R. Alison Lewis, eds., *Sub Nationalism in South Asia* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1996), 43–103.

⁴⁹ See also Embree, chapter 10 in this volume.

⁵⁰ India’s northeastern states—Assam in particular—still face secessionist threats, while the areas around Burma and Bangladesh remain troubled.

⁵¹ Raja Mohan, “India and Balance of Power,” *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 4 (July/August 2006): 18.

⁵² For background and analysis, see Robert G. Sutter, *China-India Border Friction: Background Information and Possible Implications*, CRS Report for Congress 87-514F, June 19, 1987. See also Salamat Ali, “Tension on the Border,” *FEER*, May 7, 1987, 33–35; David Bonavia, “Troubled Frontiers,” *FEER*, September 4, 1986, 14–15; “Eye-Witness in Tibet,” *FEER*, June 4, 1987, 46; Salamat Ali, “China Ups the Ante,” *FEER*, May 21, 1987, 40. Also see Waheguru Pal Siddhu and Jing Dong Yuan, “Cooperative Monitoring for Confidence Building: A Case Study of Sino- India Border Areas,” Occasional Paper 13, Sandia National Laboratories, Albuquerque, NM (August 1999), 15.

⁵³ An expression of this humiliation, a Sri Lankan sailor attacked Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi when he was reviewing the parade at Colombo a day after signing the accord. For details on the attack, see Victoria Graham, “Honor Guardsman Strikes Indian Leader with Rifle,” *Associated Press*, New Delhi, July 30, 1987; Dilip Ganguly, “Indian Prime Minister Hit by Guard,” *Associated Press*, New Delhi, July 30, 1987; Anonymous, “Rajiv Gandhi’s Assailant to Face Court Martial in Sri Lanka,” *Xinhua News Service*, Colombo, August 3, 1987; Anonymous, “Mother Calls Son’s Attack on Gandhi ‘Regrettable Act,’” *Associated Press*, Colombo, August 5, 1987; Sachi Sri

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Kantha, "The Botched JVP Hit on Rajiv Gandhi Revisited," www.tamilnation.org/forum/sachisrikantha/060729rajiv_jvp.htm.

⁵⁴ India followed up with a letter signed by Prime Minister Gandhi to the President of Sri Lanka in which Indian concerns were spelled out: I) *Your Excellency and myself will reach an early understanding about the relevance and employment of foreign military and intelligence personnel with a view to ensuring that such presences will not prejudice Indo Sri Lanka relations.* II) *Trincomalee or any other ports in Sri Lanka will not be made available for military use by any country in a manner prejudicial to India's interests.* III) *The work of restoring and operating the Trincomalee Oil Tank will be undertaken as a joint operation between India and Sri Lanka.* IV) *Sri Lanka's agreement with foreign broadcasting organizations will be reviewed to ensure that any facilities set up by them in Sri Lanka are used solely as public broadcasting facilities and not for any military or intelligence purposes.* See text of the accord at www.tamilnation.org/conflictresolution/Tamileelam/87peaceaccord.html. Extract drawn from J. N. Dixit, *Assignment Colombo* (New Delhi: Konarak Publishers, 1998). Dixit was the Indian Ambassador to Sri Lanka (work cited in above link).

⁵⁵ See, for example, Sobhan, chapter 4, and Kelegama, chapter 8, in this volume.

⁵⁶ This observation is more true of India's dealing with Pakistan and is based on the author's personal experience of negotiating peace, security, and confidence-building measures (CBMs) and dialogue with India in 1998–2001, as well as the author's subsequent discussions with officials in the Pakistan foreign ministry and military.

⁵⁷ For analysis of the ripeness theory of conflict resolution, see Zeb and Chandran, "Indo-Pak Conflicts Ripe to Resolve."

⁵⁸ The text of the Simla Agreement is available at www.stimson.org/southasia/?SN=SA20020114291.

⁵⁹ The eight agenda items for the fourth round of the composite dialogue were: (1) peace and security including confidence-building measures (CBMs) (2) Jammu and Kashmir, (3) Siachen, (4) Sir Creek, (5) Wullar barrage, (6) terrorism and drug trafficking, (7) economic and commercial cooperation, and (8) promotion of friendly exchanges.

⁶⁰ Spokesman Briefings, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Pakistan, May 15, 2008, www.mofa.gov.pk/Spokesperson/2008/May/Spokes_15_05_08.htm.

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² "Siachin, Sir Creek Issues Solvable: India," *Thaindian News*, May 20, 2008, www.thaindian.com/newsportal/uncategorized/siachen-sir-creek-issues-solvable-india_10050859.html.

⁶³ "Pak, India Allow Each Other for Hydel Power Projects Inspection," *Associated Press of Pakistan (APP)*, May 31, 2008, www.app.com.pk/en/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=39971&Itemid=2.

⁶⁴ "Indo-Pak Talks on Water Projects Inconclusive," *Daily Times*, June 2, 2008.

⁶⁵ "India to Speed Up Work on Kishanganga," *The DAWN*, June 8, 2008.

⁶⁶ "War Over Kashmir Water Heats Up," *The Economic Times*, June 8, 2008.

⁶⁷ Ibid.

⁶⁸ Sokolski, *Pakistan's Nuclear Future*, 3.

⁶⁹ U.S. support to Pakistan in the 1950s, '60s, '80s, and after 9/11 has repeatedly bailed the country out of economic crises. Meanwhile, the Kennedy administration supported India despite the emergence of the Cuban Missile Crisis during the same period.

⁷⁰ Katzenstein, *A World of Regions*, 236.

⁷¹ Perviaz Iqbal Cheema, *Pakistan's Defense Policy, 1947–58* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 113.

⁷² *Ibid.*, 114–15.

⁷³ *Ibid.*, 114.

⁷⁴ *Ibid.*, 122.

⁷⁵ Feroz Hassan Khan, "Pakistan Nuclear Future," in *South Asia in 2020: Future Strategic Balances and Alliances*, ed. Michael Chambers (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, November 2002), 157.

⁷⁶ Katzenstein, *A World of Regions*, 237.

⁷⁷ See Ernst B. Haas, "International Integration: The European and Universal Process," in "Comparing Regional Institutions: An Introduction," in *Crafting Cooperation: Regional International Institutions in Comparative Perspective*, ed. Amitav Acharya and Alastair Iain Johnston (New York: Cambridge Univ. Press), 1–31.

⁷⁸ Strobe Talbott describes how Jaswant Singh took exception to India being hyphenated with Pakistan, which India resented as a false equation. This was the foundation of what became to be known as the dehyphenation of U.S. policy toward South Asia. See Strobe Talbott, *Engaging India: Diplomacy, Democracy, and the Bomb* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2004), 85.

⁷⁹ Talbott, *Engaging India*, 85.

